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### Can information about inequality and social mobility change preferences for redistribution? Evidence from randomized controlled trials in 11 high and middle-income countries.

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### Abstract

Using new cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate if it is possible to increase people's support for the national government to address inequality through redistribution by providing them with information about inequality and social mobility in their country. We test this by conducting randomized control trials with over 50,000 online survey participants in 11 countries that make up over 30% of the global population and produce more than 40% of world GDP. Survey respondents were randomly allocated to receive either information about inequality and social mobility in their country, information about their position in the national income distribution or no information (control group). This is the first study to test the effect of providing different types of information about inequality and social mobility in the same field experiment and to include multiple middle income countries. Our key findings are as follows. Firstly, attitudes towards inequality are elastic to information in all countries but the effect varies in direction and by type of information. Whereas preferences for redistribution are only elastic to information in some countries and in the United States both types of information lowered support for redistribution. Secondly, in middle income countries, information about people's position in the national income distribution repeatedly reduces their concern about inequality regardless of whether they over- or underestimate their place, which is inconsistent with existing theories. Finally, in high-income countries, information about inequality and social mobility generally only affects the attitudes and/or preferences for redistribution of people who would not vote for one of the two major political parties in their country.

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**Keywords:** inequality, social mobility, redistribution, political economy.

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## 1 Introduction

The importance of addressing growing worldwide and national inequality has received increasing attention from policymakers, political leaders, and the media. While there is widespread discussion about the need to address inequality, a key challenge faced by policy makers is how to increase people's support for redistributive policies that can contribute to reducing inequality, such as increasing taxes and spending on welfare programs. There is a well-established body of economic theory that suggests this process should be relatively automatic as people are expected to be more supportive of redistributive policies in countries with higher inequality and lower social mobility (eg. Meltzer and Richard 1981, Piketty 1995). However, these theoretical models assume people are fully aware of the degree of inequality and social mobility in their country, whereas recent literature implies this is not the case (Gimpelson and Treisman 2017, Hauser and Norton 2017). Specifically, there is emerging evidence to suggest that often people underestimate the level of inequality in their country, overestimate the degree of social mobility and disproportionately believe they are around the middle of the national income distribution (eg. Norton and Ariely 2011, Bublitz 2016, Alesina et al 2017). This would suggest a potential way to increase people's support for the government to address inequality through redistribution would be to correct these misperceptions of inequality and social mobility.

This paper tests the effect of correcting these misperceptions of inequality and social mobility on preferences for redistribution through online randomised control trials (RCTs) surveying over 50,000 respondents that make up a nationally representative sample of the population with internet access in 11 high- and middle-income countries (Denmark, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States). Survey respondents were randomly allocated to receive either information about inequality and social mobility in their country, information about their position in the national income distribution or no information (control group). These information 'interventions' are motivated by economic models that suggest an individual's utility is dependent on static (inequality) and dynamic (social mobility) differences in consumption across society as well as their own consumption relative to others (Alesina et al 2011, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Respondents were asked questions about their attitudes towards inequality, preferences for redistribution and the most important policy the government should prioritise to reduce inequality (such as increasing the minimum wage). The questions were sourced from existing surveys on perceptions of inequality (ISSP 2009, Indrakesuma et al 2015) and are similar to questions in other experiments on this subject (Kuziemko et al 2015, Alesina et al 2017).

There is only a recent literature on field experiments that analyse how people's preferences for redistribution are affected by information about inequality. They have focused on a single dimension of inequality or social mobility and almost exclusively been conducted in high-income countries (Hauser and Norton, 2017). In many cases, these studies show that people's attitudes towards inequality seems to be more elastic to the provision of information than their preferences for redistribution (Kuziemko et al 2015, Zilinsky 2014). The prior literature has also looked at two main dimensions of treatment effect heterogeneity, which are variation in political views (right or left leaning) and the direction of misperceptions of people's position in the distribution. Information also tends to boost support among left wing voters (e.g. Alesina et al 2017) and people who overestimated their position in the distribution (e.g. Cruces et al 2013). While information often reduces support among right wing voters (e.g.

Karadja 2017) and people who underestimate their position in the distribution (e.g. Bublitz, 2016).

This study extends the existing literature in three key ways. Firstly, we include multiple treatment groups allowing us to rigorously isolate and contrast the effect of different types of information about inequality in the same population. Previous studies have solely focused on correcting a single dimension of misperceptions of inequality or social mobility. Secondly, this is the first study looking at multiple middle-income countries. Existing studies have focused almost entirely on the United States and a few Western European countries (Hauser and Norton, 2017). Finally, this study has substantially larger sample sizes than most previous field experiments on this topic, which provides greater statistical power to detect heterogeneous effects on subpopulations (such as between different types of voters).

We make three contributions to the existing knowledge on this topic by replicating some of the general findings of existing studies in different types of countries and by showing that heterogeneous effects of information appear to be far more complex and subtle than previous studies suggest. Firstly, this study reinforces the trend in some studies that people's preferences for redistribution seem to be somewhat inelastic to information about inequality, even though their attitudes towards inequality are relatively elastic (Kuziemko et al 2015, Zilinsky 2014), and extend this stylized fact to a large sample of middle-income countries. We show that people's attitudes towards inequality are elastic to information in all 11 countries, however the effect varied by type of information and direction (sometimes positive, sometimes negative). However, preferences for redistribution were only affected in a smaller number of countries (Nigeria, South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom and Denmark) and in the United States the effect was negative. In other words, even though information about inequality and social mobility often raises people's concerns across countries, this only translates into them wanting further government action to address inequality in some countries.

Secondly, simply telling people their position in the national income distribution reduces concerns about inequality in middle-income countries. This is unexpected as people who overestimated their place are told that the gap between them and the richest in society is larger than what they thought and they respond by being less concerned. Further the fact that information has an effect in the same direction regardless of people's existing perceptions is counter to prevailing wisdom whereby people's utility is improved (worsened) based upon being richer (poorer) relative to others (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This paradox requires further investigation to isolate the mechanisms through which information could be having the same effect on people regardless of whether people over- or underestimate their place in the distribution.

Thirdly, in high-income countries, information about inequality largely affects the attitudes and/or preferences for redistribution of voters who would not vote for one of the two major political parties in their country. For example, in the UK information about inequality and mobility boosts support for redistribution among non-Conservative and non-Labour party voters, but has no effect on Conservative or Labour party voters (the two largest parties). A similar trend, whereby information only affects voters not aligned to the major parties, holds in Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark and occasionally in the United States. This is a more nuanced finding than previous studies (eg. Karadja 2017, Alesina et al 2017) and may be due to these voters being more open to information changing their minds about political issues. A noteworthy exception to this trend is in regards to Republican voters in the United States

whereby information about their position in the national distribution always reduces their support for redistribution, regardless of whether they over- or underestimate their place.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details about existing studies on this topic, outlines three hypotheses (which we test) and explains the unique contributions of this study in greater detail. Section 3 outlines the methodology behind the survey and types of econometric analyses that are conducted. Sections 4 and 5 present the results and discuss how the findings relate to three hypotheses obtained from existing studies and economic theory on preferences for redistribution.

## **2 Related literature**

The two broad contributions from existing studies on this topic are summarised by Hauser and Norton (2017) as follows. Firstly, “people’s perceptions of inequality are often inaccurate and these inaccurate perceptions predict policy preferences” and secondly, “correcting these perceptions has the potential to influence people’s attitudes toward redistributive policies” (Hauser and Norton 2017, p24). In regards to the first point, the common misperceptions are threefold. Firstly, people tend to misperceive the level of inequality in their country. For example, a well-known study by Norton and Ariely (2011) shows that average Americans greatly underestimate the level of wealth inequality in their country. Secondly, people disproportionality believe they are around the middle of the national income distribution. The largest study on this topic to date by Bublitz (2016) shows that the vast majority of people think they are around the middle of the national distribution in six countries (Germany, France, Spain, Brazil, Russia and the United States). Thirdly, people tend to misperceive the degree of upward mobility in their country. For example, Davidai et al (2015) and Alesina et al (2017) show that people in the United States tend to be overly optimistic (this is consistent with the idea of the ‘American Dream’).

There is a growing body of literature that indicates perceptions of inequality – as opposed to actual levels – seem to be the main driver of people’s policy preferences (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2017, Kuhn 2015, Niehues 2014, Engelhardt and Wagener 2014). Most seminal economic theories on preferences for redistribution – such as the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis – are empirically supported by perceived, not by actual, levels of inequality (Engelhardt and Wagener 2014, Hauser and Norton 2017). Gimpelson and Treisman (2017) suggest that these existing theories on preferences for redistribution theories should be reframed accordingly. For example, an individual’s utility should be modelled based on what they perceive to be static (inequality) and dynamic (mobility) differences in consumption across society as well as based on how they think their own consumption compares to others (Alesina et al 2011, Fehr and Schmidt 1999).

The second key contribution from existing research is that correcting misperceptions of inequality can have an effect on some people’s attitudes and preferences towards redistribution (Hauser and Norton 2017). These studies have only been conducted in a small number of largely high-income countries and only tested one type of information ‘intervention’ about inequality or mobility on the same population. However, three trends that are somewhat supported by economic theory have emerged. These trends form the foundation of the three hypotheses that are examined in this experiment.

Hypothesis 1: *People's attitudes about inequality are more elastic to information than their preference for redistribution.*

This has been shown in multiple field experiments in the United States where information had an effect on people's answers to questions about their attitudes towards inequality. However, there was little effect on questions about their support for the government to address inequality. For example, Kuziemko et al (2015) illustrate that information about the level of inequality and people's position in the national income distribution raises concerns about inequality in the United States but does not affect preferences for redistribution (except in the case of inheritance taxes). In a similar study, Zilinsky (2014) shows information about the level of inequality in the United States led to greater pessimism about economic opportunity but has no effect on willingness to pay taxes. The prevailing reason that is put forward for this finding is that even though information leads people to be more concerned about inequality, they do not necessarily trust the government to address inequality (Kuziemko et al 2015, Zilinsky 2014).

We test this hypothesis by asking two types of questions to respondents. The first type relates to people's attitudes towards inequality (their concern regarding the gap between the rich and the poor as well as their optimism about improving one's economic situation through hard work), while the second type explicitly focuses on the role of the government in addressing inequality (the degree to which they believe it is the responsibility of the government to address inequality and the urgency with which government action is required). This allows us to be able to test whether information just has an effect on attitudes towards inequality or on both attitudes towards redistribution and preferences for redistribution.

Hypothesis 2: *Information will have a different effect on people depending on the direction of their misperception about their position in the income distribution (ie. people who underestimate their place in the distribution will become more supportive of redistribution and vice versa).*

Existing studies that provide respondents with information about their position in the distribution tend to show that information either boosts support among people who are poorer than they thought (overestimated place) or reduces support among people who are richer than they thought (underestimated place). For example, Cruces et al (2013) shows that information about people's position in the distribution boosts support for redistribution among people who overestimated their place in Argentina. Bublitz (2016) shows that information about the level of inequality and people's position in the national income distribution reduces support among people who underestimate their position in Germany and Russia but has no effect in other countries (France, Spain, Brazil and the United States).

We test this hypothesis by examining the heterogeneous effects from information about a respondent's place in the distribution between people who overestimate their place and those who underestimate their place. Prevailing economic wisdom is consistent with the results of existing studies whereby information should lead people who are poorer than they thought to become more supportive of redistribution (as they are more likely to gain) and people who are richer than they thought to be less supportive of redistribution (as they are more likely to lose) (Alesina et al 2011). However, there is also evidence that 'last place aversion' exists, whereby people who are near the bottom of the income distribution are less supportive of redistribution as it is most likely to benefit those directly below them (Kuziemko et al, 2014).

As such it is an empirical question as to which of these theories is likely to be more dominant in the countries in our study.

*Hypothesis 3: Information will have a different effect on people depending on their voting behaviour (ie. left wing voters will be more open to information increasing their support for redistribution and vice versa).*

There is some evidence (albeit weak) that information about inequality is likely to have a negative (positive) effect on politically right (left) leaning individuals. For example, Karadja et al (2017) show that information about a respondent's position in the distribution reduces support for redistribution among right wing voters who underestimate their position in Norway. Moreover, Alesina et al (2017) show that information about social mobility increases support for redistribution among left wing voters in the United States.

We test this hypothesis in high income countries by examining heterogeneous effects by people's responses to a question about how they would vote if an election was held today. There is extensive literature in political science about the relationship between people's voting behaviour and support for redistribution (eg. Filer et al, 1993). However, the effect of information about inequality is not always divided along political lines (Hauser and Norton 2017, Kuziemko et al 2015). A major contribution of this study is that there is a much larger sample size to be able to detect statistically significant effects between types of voters, such as those that vote for each of the major parties and those that would not vote for a major party. Therefore, the results provide better insight than what currently exists on the effect of information down political lines.

Against this background, we extend the existing literature in three important ways. Firstly, this is the first time that multiple treatment groups with different types of information about inequality are tested in the same field experiment. Existing studies have only provided information about inequality to a single treatment group, which means researchers are unable to rigorously test how different misperceptions of inequality affect preferences for information. For example, some studies provide information about the overall level of inequality and a respondent's place in the distribution to the same treatment group (Kuziemko et al 2015, Bublitz 2016). This means it is not possible to detect which type of information is affecting preferences for redistribution. Our study is designed to overcome this limitation by isolating how elastic preferences for redistribution are to different types of information that aim to correct the misperceptions of inequality discussed above. This is particularly important as most economic models on this topic factor in that individual's utility is dependent on static (inequality) and dynamic (mobility) differences in consumption across society as well as their own consumption relative to others (Alesina et al 2011).

Secondly, this field experiment provides a global perspective on the effect of information on preferences for redistribution and is by far the largest study of its kind to date. There are around ten times more respondents than in any other field experiment on this topic in a larger number of countries than in all previous studies combined. Collectively, the 11 countries in this study make up around 30% of the world's population and produce about 40% of the world's GDP. In addition, this is the first time the elasticity of preferences for redistribution with respect to the provision of information about inequality is tested in multiple middle-income countries. Previous studies have largely been limited to the United States and a small number of European countries and it is not clear how generalizable the results are to other contexts. The effect of information is likely to be dissimilar in middle-income countries

compared to high-income countries due to factors such as different norms and attitudes toward redistribution, weaker state capacity to administer redistribution, and larger knowledge gaps, due to less information being available and lower levels of education.

Finally, this study overcomes some of the limitations of previous research that are based on smaller sample sizes. In every country, each treatment group has at least 800 respondents and on average there are over 1,100 respondents, which is considerably higher than in most other studies. As such this study has substantially more power to detect statistically significant heterogeneous effects on subpopulations.

### **3 Methodology**

This field experiment was conducted with over 50,000 respondents in 11 high and middle-income countries (Denmark, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States). Similar to the case of other field experiments on this topic, data was collected through nationally representative online surveys conducted by the firms YouGov and RIWI during the last three months of 2017 (see Appendix C for details). The study was pre-registered with the American Economic Association RCT Registry (Hoy and Mager, 2017). Prior to the experiment, respondents were asked questions about what they perceive and would prefer the current level of inequality to be in their country as well as where they perceive themselves to be in the national income distribution (see the survey instrument in Appendix A). In addition, respondents were asked questions about their demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, location and income) and who they would vote for if there was a national election today.

Following the background questions in the survey, respondents were randomly allocated into either one of two treatment groups or a control group and people in the treatment groups received information about inequality. Randomisation ensured that the differences between the treatment and control groups were not statistically significant for almost all demographic characteristics in each country (see the balance tables for each country that are listed in Appendix E). The information interventions were based upon what has been used in other studies but were simplified to make it more accessible to the average individual, especially for those with lower levels of education (Appendix B contains the information interventions that were shown). Respondents in Treatment Group A were shown information about the overall level of inequality in the form of a pie chart with two sentences describing what it says along with three sentences about social mobility. The information on wealth inequality was sourced from Credit Suisse Wealth report 2016 and was portrayed as pie chart following feedback from focus group participants in Indonesia. The information about social mobility was taken directly from Alesina et al (2017). Qualitative information is used because providing an order of magnitude around social mobility is challenging due to data constraints and the necessity to make information relevant for each country. Respondents in Treatment Group B were shown two sentences and an image of a ladder depicting their quintile based upon their reported income as well as information about how many million people were richer and poorer than them. This type of information is similar to what was provided in the case of Cruces et al (2013) and Karadja et al (2017). The main difference is that respondents were only informed about their quintile (as opposed to their decile) because the study was designed to be easy to follow even by people who lack basic numeracy. Respondents in the control group did not receive any information.

Respondents were then asked a series of questions about their beliefs about inequality and their support for redistribution. The survey questions were sourced from previous studies on this topic and the main questions of interest are shown in Table 1 below. Specifically, the first row of questions was sourced from the ISSP (2009) and the second comes from a World Bank study (Indrakesuma et al 2015). Most existing studies on this topic, such as Alesina et al (2017), also draw on variations of these types of questions to measure attitudes towards inequality and preferences for redistribution. In addition, respondents were asked to select the most important policy from a list of seven options the government should prioritise to reduce inequality (question structure sourced from Indrakesuma et al (2015) and adjusted for each country following consultations with local stakeholders).

**Table 1 – Main questions of interest**

<b>ATTITUDES TOWARDS INEQUALITY</b>	<b>PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION</b>
<b>GAP</b> - To what extent do you agree with the following statement “The gap between the rich and the poor in (COUNTRY X) is too large” (Strongly Agree=5, Agree=4, Neither Agree or Disagree=3, Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1)	<b>RESPONSIBILITY</b> - To what extent do you agree with the following statement “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor?” (Strongly Agree=5, Agree=4, Neither Agree or Disagree=3, Disagree=2, Strongly Disagree=1)
<b>DIFFICULT</b> - In your opinion, in (COUNTRY X) if people are willing to work hard, how easy is it for them to increase the amount of money they have? (Easy=1, Difficult=2, Impossible=3)	<b>URGENT</b> - In your opinion, how urgent or not urgent does the difference in incomes between rich and poor in (COUNTRY X) need to be resolved by the (COUNTRY X) government? (Very Urgent=4, Urgent=3, Somewhat Urgent=2, Not Urgent=1)

Our analysis compares differences between the treatment and control groups to capture the effect of information. We perform two types of empirical analysis. The first type is based on calculating the average effect of information for each treatment group on each question in each country by using an ordered logit model. We create a dummy variable for each treatment group, which takes on the value one if the respondent belongs to the relevant treatment group and the value zero if the respondent belongs to the control group. We estimate the following ordered logit model separately for each treatment group in each country:

$$Y_j = B_{0j} + B_{1j}T1 + \varepsilon,$$

where  $Y_j$  is the answer to question  $j$  in Table 1.  $T1$  is an indicator variable that takes on the value one for members of the treatment group and zero for members of the control group.  $\varepsilon$  is the model error term. Our parameter of interest is the ordered logit coefficient  $B_{1j}$ , which captures differences in the response to question  $j$  between treatment and control group.  $B_{1j}$  does not have a meaningful quantitative interpretation due to the nonlinear nature of the ordered dependent variables. Providing a quantitative interpretation would require the calculation of several marginal effects associated with each parameter estimate. For simplicity, we focus on the qualitative interpretation of  $B_{1j}$ , which allows us to draw inferences about the direction and statistical significance of the information effects. The qualitative results are summarised in Tables 2 and 3 and the full results are presented in Appendix F.

Our second type of analysis considers the effect of information on each option to each question separately. By doing so we avoid calculating the average effect of information across all options to each of the questions above. Studies have shown that providing information can have a polarizing or convergence effect whereby people might be more or less likely to select extreme options (Sunstein 2001, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011, Baysen 2017). For example, in our study information could increase or decrease the likelihood that people select ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. Therefore, our second approach involves creating dummy variables for each option of each question in Table 1 and estimating a linear probability model for each treatment group in each country and for each option to each question in Table 1. The estimates to this linear probability model were compared to those obtained from a binary logit model and they were shown to be qualitatively similar. Our linear probability model may be written as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_{0ij} + \alpha_{1ij}T1 + \gamma,$$

where  $Y_{ij}$  is an indicator variable that takes on the value one for answer  $i$  to question  $j$  and zero for all other answers to question  $j$ .  $T1$  is an indicator variable that compares the treatment group to the control group and  $\gamma$  is the model error term.  $\alpha_{1ij}$  captures the average difference between respondents in the treatment and respondents in the control group that selected response  $i$  to question  $j$ . The results of these regressions are included in Appendix G.

In addition to the two main types of regressions discussed above, we analyse heterogeneous effects. Based upon the results of previous studies, we pay particular attention to heterogeneous effects with regard to people’s political preferences and we consider differences between people who over- or underestimate their place in the income distribution.

## 4 Results

The results presented below focus on the effect of providing information about inequality on preferences for redistribution. As mentioned earlier, prior to the experiment respondents were also asked questions about their perceptions of inequality. The answers to these questions show that the misperceptions of inequality found in other studies also exist among respondents to our surveys (see Appendix D for details). This provides a solid foundation for testing the impact of correcting these misperceptions through the provision of information about inequality.

The main effects on beliefs about inequality and preferences for redistribution from information about Treatment A (overall level of inequality and mobility) and Treatment B (respondent’s position in income distribution) are discussed one by one below.

### Treatment A - Information about overall inequality and mobility

Information about the overall level of inequality and the degree of mobility has significant effects on beliefs about inequality but this does not lead to changes in preferences for redistribution in middle-income countries (with the exception of South Africa). Due to the large number of parameters that needs to be estimated to obtain a quantitative interpretation of the effects, Table 2 only reports the signs and significance levels of the coefficients of the ordered logit regressions for each question and for each country. For example, Table 2 shows

that the coefficient of the ordered logit regression for Indonesia with regard to the first question about the gap between rich and poor is positive and significant at the 5% level. This implies that information about the overall level of inequality and mobility has a positive effect on being concerned about the gap between rich and poor in Indonesia. In the remainder of this section, the effect of information is discussed by drawing upon the second type of econometric analysis that was conducted, a linear probability model for each option to each question for each country (results in Appendix G). These results are qualitatively similar to the ordered logit results in the table below, however the magnitude of the effect of information is simpler to describe.

**Table 2 – The effect of providing information about the overall level of inequality and the degree of mobility**

	ATTITUDES TOWARDS INEQUALITY		PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION	
	Gap	Difficult	Urgent	Responsibility
Indonesia	+	+	0	0
South Africa	0	+	+	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0
Morocco	0	+	0	0
India	0	0	0	0
Mexico	0	0	0	0
Denmark	+	+	+	+
UK	+	+	+	+
US	-	0	0	-
Netherlands	0	+	0	0
Spain	-	0	0	0

\*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Note: 0 indicates the information had no statistically significant effect

In middle-income countries there is some evidence to suggest that information causes people to be more pessimistic about being able to improve their circumstances through hard work, but has little effect on people’s views about whether the gap between the rich and poor is too large. For example, in Morocco the treatment group was 5.3 percentage points more likely to state that it is difficult or impossible to increase the amount of money a person has despite hard work (62.1% compared to 56.8%).

It is profound that there is effectively no evidence of information about the overall level of inequality and mobility shifting preferences for redistribution in middle-income countries (with the exception of South Africa), especially given the large sample size in the treatment and control groups.

There was some evidence that information about the overall level of inequality and mobility affects people’s policy preferences. In Indonesia, respondents in this treatment group are 5 percentage points more likely to select raising the minimum wage or creating jobs when they were provided with a list of seven policy options that the government should prioritise to address inequality (34.7% compared to 29.4%, respectively). In South Africa, levels of

support for basic income grants were around one-third lower in the treatment group than in the control group (7.5% compared to 10.7%).

In high-income countries there are substantial effects from information about inequality and mobility across both beliefs and preferences for redistribution, however the direction varies between countries. In the case of the UK and Denmark, information always results in the treatment group having a higher level of concern and support for redistribution than the control group. For example, respondents in the treatment group in the UK are 9 percentage points more likely to strongly agree that the gap between the rich and poor is too large (56.0% vs 47.0%). In contrast, treatment groups in Spain and the United States are less concerned about inequality and in the United States are less supportive of redistribution. For example, members of the treatment group in Spain are 3.9 percentage points less likely to strongly agree that the gap between the rich and poor is too large than members of the control group (37.1% compared to 41.0%).

Importantly, this type of information appears to have a large effect among people who did not state that they would vote for one of the major parties in high-income countries. In the United States, respondents in the treatment group are 5.1 percentage points less likely to strongly agree that the government has the responsibility to address the gap between rich and poor (20.6% compared to 25.6%). This effect is largely driven by people who do not know who they would vote for if there was an election today, in other words non-Republicans and non-Democrats, who were 8.5 percentage points less likely to strongly agree (16.5% compared to 25.0%). A similar trend (but in the opposite direction) exists in the UK whereby the treatment group is 6 percentage points more likely to strongly agree that the government has the responsibility to address the gap between rich and poor than the control group (35.3% compared to 29.2%). Once again this effect is entirely driven by non-Conservative party and non-Labour party voters (the two major parties) in the treatment group who are 10.2 percentage points more likely to strongly agree compared to those in the control group (40.0% compared to 29.8%).

A similar trend also holds in Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark whereby information tends to only affect people who would not vote for the two main parties. In Spain, the average difference between the share of respondents in treatment and control groups who strongly agree that the gap between rich and poor is too large is 3.8 percentage points (37.2% compared to 41.0%). This effect is driven by people in the treatment group who would not vote for the two main parties if there was an election today who were 6.2 percentage points less likely to strongly agree the gap is too large (40.4% compared to 46.8%). In the Netherlands, the average difference between the share of respondents in treatment and control groups who believe it is easy to improve one's economic circumstances is 3.1 percentage points (19.3% compared to 22.4%). This effect is driven by people in the treatment group who would not vote for the two main parties if there was an election today who were 3.6 percentage points less likely to hold this view (17.9% compared to 21.5%). In Denmark, a comparable pattern holds. For example, the average difference between the share of respondents in treatment and control groups who strongly agree that the gap between rich and poor is too large is 4.3 percentage points (20.7% compared to 16.4%). This effect is driven by people in the treatment group who would not vote for the two main parties if there was an election today who are 5.6 percentage points more likely to strongly agree (23.3% compared to 17.7%).

#### Treatment B - Information about the position in the distribution

Existing studies along with economic theory suggest that information about a person's place in the distribution is likely to have opposite effects on people depending on whether they over- or underestimate their position in the distribution. As such the findings to Treatment B are divided between people who overestimate their place (around half of respondents in most countries) and those who underestimate their place (along with the people who accurately estimate their place). A summary of the main results for this information treatment disaggregated between those who overestimate their place and those that do not is shown in Table 3 in the same form as in Table 2 (with the exception of Indonesia and Denmark where this type of analysis was not possible, see Appendix C). As above, our estimates of the information effects are based on a linear probability model for each response to each question and for each country (the complete results are provided in Appendix G).

**Table 3 – The effect of providing information about a respondent's position in the distribution among those people who overestimate their position**

	ATTITUDES TOWARDS INEQUALITY				PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION			
	Gap		Difficult		Urgent		Responsibility	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Indonesia								
South Africa	-*	-**	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	-***	0	0	0	0	0	0	+**
Morocco	-*	-**	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	-***	-*	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	-**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark								
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US	0	+***	0	0	0	-**	-**	-**
Netherlands	-*	0	0	+*	0	0	0	0
Spain	-***	0	0	-*	0	0	0	0

\*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

(a) Effect from information about position in distribution (among those who overestimated)

(b) Effect from information about position in distribution (among those who under or accurately estimated)

Note: 0 indicates the information had no statistically significant effect

### *Overestimated position in the income distribution*

Letting people know they are poorer than they thought had a consistently negative effect on beliefs about inequality in most countries, but no effect on preferences for redistribution (with the exception of the United States). In middle-income countries, Spain and the Netherlands, information about a respondent's place in the distribution resulted in people in the treatment group who overestimated their place being less likely to believe the gap between rich and poor is too large. Despite this there was some evidence that informing

people they are poorer than they thought lead to support for higher taxes on the rich in Mexico and India. People who overestimate their place in this treatment group in Mexico and India are around 2.5 percentage points more supportive of taxes on the rich as the number one policy the government should prioritise to address inequality (6.3% compared to 3.8% and 7.7% compared to 5.4%, respectively).

Similar to the case in which information about the overall level of inequality and mobility was provided, the effects are divided along political lines in some of the high-income countries. In the case of the United States, respondents in the treatment group who overestimate their place are 4.2 percentage points more likely to disagree with the statement that it is the responsibility of the government to reduce the gap between the rich and poor (17.0% compared to 12.8%). This effect is largely driven by Republican voters, with those in the treatment group being 16.5 percentage points more likely to disagree with the statement (41.2% compared to 24.8%). In the case of Spain, respondents in the treatment group who overestimate their place are 4.0 percentage points more likely to disagree the gap between the rich and the poor is too large (9.7% compared to 5.7%). This finding is driven by people who would not vote for the major parties in Spain, with those in the treatment group being 5.4 percentage points more likely to disagree with the statement (9.6% compared to 4.2%). In the Netherlands, respondents in the treatment group who overestimate their place are 4.8 percentage points less likely to agree that the gap between rich and poor is too large (63.1% compared to 67.9%). Once again, this result is driven by people who would not vote for the major parties, and those in the treatment group are 5.6 percentage points less likely to agree with the statement (62.6% compared to 68.2%).

Interestingly, providing information about a respondent's place in the distribution increases support for the government to cut corporate tax as a top priority to reduce inequality among Republican voters in the United States who overestimate their place. Overall, people in the treatment group in the United States who overestimate their place are 2.4 percentage points more supportive of tax cuts for corporations as the top policy the government should prioritise to address inequality (5.7% compared to 3.2%). This overall effect is entirely driven by Republican voters as those in the treatment group were 8.6 percentage points more likely to support this policy than those in the control group (13.2% compared to 4.6%).

#### *Underestimated or accurately estimated position in the income distribution*

Informing people that they are richer than they thought has a positive effect in some countries and a negative effect in others. In middle-income countries there appears to be a negative effect on beliefs about the gap between the rich and the poor and no effect on preferences for redistribution, except in Nigeria. In Nigeria, respondents in the treatment group who underestimate their place are 9.6 percentage points more likely to strongly agree the government has the responsibility to reduce the gap between the rich and poor (52.3% compared to 42.6%). This effects is driven by people who state that they do not know who they would vote for if there was an election today. Members of this group are 25.4 percentage points more likely to select strongly agree if they belong to the treatment group compared to the control group (59.5% compared to 34.1%).

In the case of high-income countries, there is no consistent effect from information. In the United States, people in the treatment group who underestimate or accurately estimate their place are on average more likely to strongly agree that the gap between the rich and the poor is too large but less likely to strongly agree it is the government's responsibility to reduce this

gap. This result is driven by different types of voters. While undecided voters are more concerned about inequality, Republicans are less supportive of government action. In regard to strongly agreeing that the gap between the rich and poor is too large, the average effect is 7.5 percentage points (44.8% compared to 37.3%). However, this effect is driven by undecided voters in the treatment group who are 14.5 percentage points more likely to strongly agree (47.2% compared to 32.8%). In contrast, Republican voters in the treatment group are 18.2 percentage points more likely to disagree that it is the government's responsibility to reduce the gap between rich and poor (51.2% compared to 33.0%).

In the Netherlands and Spain there are mixed effects from information in regard to people's beliefs about how difficult it is to improve one's circumstances through hard work. In the Netherlands, providing information reduces the fraction of people who are likely to believe that it is easy to improve one's circumstances through hard work by 5.6 percentage points (18.0% compared to 23.6%). Interestingly, this reduction is partly driven by far right supporters in the treatment group who are 13.7 percentage points less likely to select easy (16.4% compared to 30.2%). In Spain, information reduces the fraction of people who believe that it is difficult or impossible to improve one's circumstances through hard work by 6.8 percentage points (56.3% compared to 63.1%). This reduction is partly driven by people who do not vote for one of the two largest parties, with the treatment group being 7.7 percentage points less likely to select difficult or impossible than the control group (56.9% compared to 64.6%).

Interestingly, including both those who over- and underestimate their place in the distribution, people in the treatment group in Spain are 2.3 percentage points more supportive of taxes on the rich as a policy for the government to prioritise to address inequality (9.0% compared to 6.7%). This overall effect is actually due to people who underestimate their place in the distribution as those in the treatment group are 3.9 percentage points more likely to support this policy than those in the control group (9.6% compared to 5.7%).

## **5 Discussion**

The implications of the results from this study are discussed in relationship to the three hypotheses that emerge from existing studies.

*Hypothesis 1: People's attitudes about inequality are more elastic to information than their preference for redistribution.*

The findings from this study are consistent with this hypothesis. People's beliefs about inequality are elastic to information about inequality in all countries, however the effect varies by type of information and can be positive or negative. People's preferences for redistribution seem to be somewhat inelastic to information in many of the countries. This finding implies that even though information about inequality and social mobility often raises people's concerns, these concerns only occasionally translate into them wanting further government action to address inequality.

### *Middle-income countries*

Attitudes towards inequality are quite elastic in middle-income countries and the effect varies by type of information. Providing information about overall inequality and mobility often

results in greater pessimism about economic opportunities despite hard work. This finding is consistent with studies in the United States, which demonstrate that people's beliefs about inequality can become more pessimistic with information (Kuziemko et al 2015, Zilinsky 2014). Information about the relative position in the income distribution seems to lower concerns about the gap between the rich and the poor.

There were only two middle-income countries in which providing information about inequality had an effect on preferences for redistribution. In South Africa information about the overall level of inequality and mobility boosts support for urgent action by the government and in Nigeria informing people that they are richer than they expected increases support for the notion that the government is responsible for the gap between rich and poor. The results for Nigeria are not consistent with most existing studies and economic models as people who found out that they were better off than they thought typically had a greater desire for the government to redistribute to assist those worse off in society. However, they are consistent with the idea that people are averse to inequality and they use their own living standards (and those around them) as a reference point for what standards of living are adequate for others in general (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).

In the other middle-income countries, there are at least two reasons why an effect might not be detected. Firstly, as has been suggested in previous studies in high-income countries, people may lack trust in the government to effectively deliver solutions to inequality (Kuziemko et al 2015, Zilinsky 2014). This is potentially even more of an issue in developing countries where social contracts between society and politicians tend to be weaker (McCarthy, 2016). Interestingly, an additional question was included in the survey in Mexico that showed respondents in the treatment group who received information about the overall level of inequality and mobility were *more* likely to trust the federal government to address inequality relative to the control group (22.1% compared to 18.0%). This would seem to suggest that information about inequality might not reduce trust in the government as previous studies have surmised, although clearly further research is required on this issue.

Secondly, information may not have had an effect on preferences for redistribution as it simply provides an order of magnitude around the extent of inequality. In most middle-income countries inequality is clearly visible (especially in urban areas) and simply informing people of the percentage shares of the rich compared to the poor or their relative place in the distribution might not be surprising information. There is also reason to believe that respondents with lower levels of education (and numeracy) might not be able to fully appreciate the magnitude of the information that was contained in the treatment. However, it is unclear how the information intervention could have had an effect on attitudes if it was not at least partly understood.

### *High-income countries*

There are varying effects of providing information on attitudes towards redistribution in high-income countries, which is in line with the findings of existing studies (Hauser and Norton, 2017). In the case of the UK, providing information about inequality and mobility raises concerns about inequality, while information about the relative position in the income distribution has no effect. In Spain information about inequality and mobility reduces concerns about inequality and a similar pattern exists in terms of letting people know about their place in the distribution. The results are more complex in the United States and the Netherlands because providing different types of information leads to different effects. For

example, in the United States, information about inequality and mobility reduces pessimism about the gap between rich and poor, while information about one's place in the distribution raises concerns among people who underestimate their place.

Similar to attitudes towards inequality, information about inequality does not have a consistent effect on preferences for redistribution across high-income countries. Information about inequality and mobility increases preferences for redistribution in the UK and in Denmark and reduces preferences for redistribution in the US. Information about a respondent's place in the distribution has no impact on preferences for redistribution in high-income countries, except in the United States. This result is fairly similar to some existing studies, especially Bublitz (2016), whereby correcting misperceptions about people's position in the distribution tends to have little effect even though this dominates economic theory on this issue. For example, the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis (1981) and the prospect for upward mobility hypothesis (Benabou and Ok, 2001) postulate that people's preferences for redistribution being largely based on their place in the distribution.

*Hypothesis 2: Information will have an opposite effect on people depending on the direction of people's misperception about their position in the income distribution (ie. people who underestimate their place in the distribution will become more supportive of redistribution and vice versa).*

The findings to this study contradict this hypothesis, especially in middle-income countries. In middle-income countries it does not matter where people think they are in the distribution. Simply being told their actual place reduces their concern about the gap between rich and poor. This is not consistent with standard economic theory and existing studies, which suggest that when people are told that they are poorer than they thought they would be more concerned about the gap between the rich and the poor (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This result may be due to people who are poorer than they thought discovering there is a smaller share of the population who are worse off than them and as such the overall gap between the rich and poor is smaller than what they believed.

In high-income countries, there was no consistent effect of information about people's position in the income distribution and often the results were not consistent with economic theory. For example, when people were informed that they were poorer than they thought, they became less concerned about the gap between the rich and the poor in Spain and the Netherlands and less likely to agree the government had a responsibility between the rich and poor in the United States. In addition, when people in the United States found out they were richer than they thought, they became more concerned about the gap between the rich and poor, which is also unexpected. However, this finding is consistent with a study in the United States that shows when people who underestimate their place in the global income distribution were informed of their actual place, they are more likely to donate to a charity working in developing countries and more supportive of foreign aid (Nair, 2016).

*Hypothesis 3: Information will have a different effect on people depending on their voting behaviour (ie. left wing voters will be more open to information increasing their support for redistribution and vice versa).*

The findings from this study are not quite consistent with this hypothesis as the heterogeneous effects between voters in high-income countries is more nuanced than previous studies suggest. Information seems to largely shift beliefs among voters who are not

aligned with the major two parties in high-income countries. This trend, which was observed in the UK, Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands (occasionally in the United States), may be driven by the fact that people in this category (of which selecting 'do not know' was the most common answer) are undecided about their political preferences and are more open to receiving information. An important exception to this trend are Republican voters in the United States who always respond negatively (ie less supportive of the government being responsible to close the gap between rich and poor), regardless of whether they over- or underestimate their place. Previous studies suggest that right wing voters become less supportive when they are informed that they are richer than they thought (Karadja et al, 2017), which is line with economic theory as they are less likely to benefit from redistribution. However, the reduced support among Republican voters who find out that they are poorer than they thought is surprising. This could be partly due to the idea of 'last place aversion' (Kuziemko et al, 2014) whereby people towards the bottom end of the distribution are less supportive of redistribution if it helps people directly below them.

## **6 Conclusions**

This paper provides a global perspective on the effect of providing information about inequality on people's preferences towards redistribution based on internationally comparable field experiments. We extend the existing research on this topic in three key ways. Firstly, previous studies have only had one treatment group with information about inequality, whereas we include multiple treatment groups with different types of information about inequality. Secondly, existing studies have focused almost entirely on the United States and a few Western European countries, whereas this study covers more countries than all previous studies combined (including several middle-income countries). Finally, we overcome some of the limitations of previous studies that are based on smaller sample sizes, which allows us to better estimate heterogeneous effects.

We make three contributions to the existing knowledge on this topic by replicating some of the general findings of existing studies in different types of countries and by showing that heterogeneous information effects appear to be far more complex than previous studies have shown. Firstly, this study reinforces the trend in some studies that people's preferences for redistribution seem to be somewhat inelastic to information about inequality, even though their attitudes towards inequality are relatively elastic (Kuziemko et al 2015, Zilinsky 2014). We show that people's attitudes towards inequality are elastic to information in all 11 countries. However, the effect varies by type of information and direction (sometimes the effect is positive, and sometimes negative). Preferences for redistribution are only affected in a small number of countries (Nigeria, South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom and Denmark), while the effect is negative in the United States. More studies in a variety of other countries are required to be able to determine if this trend is universal in nature.

Secondly, simply information people about their place in the distribution (including people who are poorer than they thought) reduces concern about inequality in middle-income countries. The fact that information has an effect in the same direction regardless of people's existing perceptions is counterintuitive because people's utility is improved (worsen) based upon being richer (poorer) relative to others. Future research should focus on understanding how information that theory would suggest is positive for some people and negative for others could have the same effect.

Finally, in high-income countries, information about inequality tended to only affect the preferences for redistribution of voters who would not vote for one of the two major parties in their country. This is a more nuanced finding compared to previous studies and may be due to these voters being more open to information changing their minds about political issues. Additional analysis is required to understand how existing political alignment affects the elasticity of people's preferences for redistribution to information.

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## **APPENDIX LIST**

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## APPENDIX A – SURVEY QUESTIONS

Prior to the field experiment these questions were asked

Assume the total American population is broken into 5 income groups, each with the same number of people. Click on the graph that you think shows:

how income is **CURRENTLY** distributed between these groups.



Extremely  
Unequal



Very  
Unequal



Somewhat  
Unequal



Less  
Unequal



Somewhat  
Equal



Completely  
Equal

In which of these income groups do you place **your household**? ✕

<b>Richest</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Richest</b>	<b>Middle</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Poorest</b>	<b>Poorest</b>
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Regardless of how you previously answered, which best shows  
how income **SHOULD** be distributed?



Extremely  
Unequal



Very  
Unequal



Somewhat  
Unequal



Less  
Unequal



Somewhat  
Equal



Completely  
Equal

Respondents who were randomly allocated into one of the treatment groups were provided with information at this point in time and then completed the following questions.

Do you agree or disagree that **“The gap between the rich and the poor in the USA is too large”**? ✕

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree  
nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly  
disagree

In the USA, if people are willing to work hard, how easy or difficult is it for them to increase the amount of money they have? ✕

Easy

Difficult

Impossible

Don't know

How urgently should the government of the USA act to address the difference in income between the rich and poor?

Very urgently

Urgently

Less urgently

Not urgent at all

Don't know

To what extent do you agree or disagree that:  
**"It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor"?**

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree  
nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly  
disagree

Don't know

Which one of the following is the **MOST important** for the government of the USA to do, to reduce income inequality?

Increase funding for safety net programs like social security, Medicaid and nutrition assistance

Cut taxes for large companies

Raise taxes on the rich

Pass legislation to ensure equal pay for women

Cut regulations on businesses

Raise the minimum wage

Provide free and high quality education and medical care for all people

Other / Don't know




Following the field experiment respondents were also asked questions about what they thought the average wage was of an unskilled worker and CEO in a national company in their country. They were then asked what they would prefer the wages to be of an unskilled worker and CEO in a national company in their country

## APPENDIX B – EXAMPLES OF THE INFORMATION INTERVENTIONS PROVIDED

The richest 20% of people in the USA have **88%** of the country's wealth (wealth = total value of assets such as savings, house etc.).

This leaves over 260 million people with only 12% of the country's wealth.



Recent research shows:

FACT 1 – Only very few children from poor American families ever become rich, the vast majority **stay poor** throughout their life.

FACT 2 – Children born into rich American families are extremely likely to **remain rich** when they grow up.

Based upon your reported income, your household is in the 2nd richest 20%. This means around 65 million Americans are richer than you and 195 million Americans are poorer than you.



Your household

## **APPENDIX C – DETAILS ABOUT SURVEY METHODOLOGY**

This study randomly allocated respondents into treatment groups and a control group which ensured that the internal validity of the experiment is robust, however the external validity (generalisability) of the findings are dependent on the representativeness of the surveys. The online surveys were conducted by two different survey firms (YouGov and RIWI) across the 11 countries and captured a nationally representative sample of the internet population in each country. Obviously it is not possible to survey people through an online platform if they don't have access to the internet, but this is an increasingly small share of the population in most countries included in this study. However it is important to note that the findings are only generalizable for the internet population as opposed to the broader population in each country.

There was a slight variation in the sampling approach used by the firms. YouGov (conducted the surveys in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Indonesia) used a traditional panel survey approach whereas RIWI (conducted the surveys in the United States, Spain, the Netherlands, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco and Mexico) reaches the general internet population through incorrect and lapsed URLs. Both sampling strategies are internationally respected and have been shown to provide a sample of respondents that is representative of the internet population. We examined how much of a difference the sampling methodology may be making by conducting the same survey using the different approaches in Mexico. In general, the effect of information was similar between the surveys however the level of support for redistribution in the control group tended to be higher in the panel survey.

On average across all the countries there was an attrition rate of around 25-30% which is similar to other surveys of this nature, such as Kuziemko et al (2015) which was published in the American Economic Review. The attrition rate for the field experiment was higher among respondents in the countries where the surveys were conducted by RIWI.

Due to financial constraints it was not possible to provide a second information treatment in Denmark and include a question about perceived place in the distribution in Indonesia. These countries are excluded from the sections of the paper that discuss the impact of information about place in the distribution.

Data about the income distribution in each country was sourced from the World Bank (WDI 2017, PovcalNET 2017) for the middle income countries and the OECD for high income countries (OECD, 2017). Respondents were asked about the number of household members as well as the household's total annual income. This information was used to determine their place in the national income distribution. People who are asked to report their income, especially over longer periods of time, often underestimate total household income (World Bank, 2014). While this may be the case in this study, all studies that rely on reported income face this challenge.

## APPENDIX D – SUMMARY OF THE DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS

### *Median bias and misestimates of place in income distribution*

Consistent with previous studies, we find evidence the majority of respondents across all countries struggle to correctly identify which quintile in the income distribution they belong to. What is more, we find these misperceptions play out similarly across all countries and that there is strong ‘median bias’, whereby people think they are around the middle of the distribution regardless of their actual place.






Calculated based on their reported annual household income (in per capita terms), the minority of respondents pick the correct income quintile (see Table A1). This ranges from 15% in Nigeria to 27% in the US. On average, the majority of respondents overestimate their place in the income distribution (56%) while a minority underestimate it (23%).

Table A1: Correct, over and underestimates of income place in 9 out of 11 countries


Country	Pick the correct quintile, %	Overestimate their place, %	Underestimate their place, %	Think they are in middle income group, %	Correlation coefficient between actual and perceived place	Total responses
UK	22.4	31.7	45.9	48.3	0.3385	2840
Nigeria	14.8	72.6	12.6	56.6	0.1585	5311
India	17.6	60.5	21.9	66.7	0.2191	5594
US	27.4	51.8	20.8	50.3	0.3076	5378
Spain	24.9	57.0	18.2	52.3	0.3043	4585
ZA	21.3	59.8	18.9	53.7	0.2546	5139
Morocco	22.0	64.3	13.7	51.1	0.2604	4606
Netherlands	24.3	47.2	28.5	54.4	0.2667	5339
Mexico	17.8	68.7	13.5	60.8	0.2005	4361

We find evidence of consistent and similar bias across all countries whereby the majority of people think they sit in the middle income category. In fact, the distribution of perceived income place is somewhat similar across all 11 countries and the presence of median bias striking (see Table A2).


Table A2: Perceived income position (poorest to richest) in each of the countries (except Indonesia)

UK	 <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Percent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>33</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>48</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>2</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Percent	1	12	2	33	3	48	4	5	5	2
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Nigeria	 <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Percent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>10</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>53</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>22</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Percent	1	5	2	10	3	53	4	12	5	22
Category	Percent												
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5	22												
India	 <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Percent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>13</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>61</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>10</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>8</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Percent	1	9	2	13	3	61	4	10	5	8
Category	Percent												
1	9												
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4	10												
5	8												
US	 <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Percent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>14</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>24</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>51</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>6</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Percent	1	14	2	24	3	51	4	6	5	6
Category	Percent												
1	14												
2	24												
3	51												
4	6												
5	6												
Spain	 <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Percent</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>13</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>22</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>48</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>10</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>7</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Percent	1	13	2	22	3	48	4	10	5	7
Category	Percent												
1	13												
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
South Africa




Morocco




Netherlands



Mexico



Denmark



### *Estimating the extent of inequality*

Our experiment used six different income distributions, visualised as pie charts (see Annex C) to capture how respondents thought income was currently distributed in their country, and how it should be distributed. The first four pie charts (starting from most unequal) are based upon how income is actually distributed in South Africa, Indonesia, the United Kingdom and Norway respectively. The last two pie charts, which are the most equal, do not exist in any country in the world. Therefore, when we quantify what share of respondents under- or overestimate the level of inequality in their country, we refer to the income distribution that is closest to the actual levels in each country based on data from the World Bank (WDI 2017).

Our method for measuring respondents' existing perceptions of income inequality is similar to previous studies on this topic. Most studies, such as Niehaus (2014), rely on data from ISSP (2009), which used visuals that were of a more qualitative nature to show how income is shared between population segments. Whereas some studies like Norton and Ariely (2011) use a more advanced approach to measure the wealth concentration of population quintiles in the United States. These different approaches reflect there is not (yet) one undisputed way of capturing people's perceived level of inequality in a survey (Hauser and Norton, 2017).

Our data shows respondents' existing perceptions of inequality are skewed in a way not dissimilar from how they perceive their place in the income distribution (see Table A3). Across countries a minority picks the correct distribution, while the majority underestimate the level of inequality and a significant share picks a more equal distribution than what is currently the case. These findings are relatively similar to previous studies from the United States, Australia and Indonesia showing people underestimate the level of wealth inequality in their country (Norton et al 2011, Norton et al 2014, Indrakesuma et al 2015).

Table A3: Perceived level of inequality by country

	Pick the correct distribution, %	Pick a more equal distribution than what is the case	Pick a less equal distribution than what is the case, %	Total responses
South Africa	28.5	71.5	0.0	8816
India	18.6	55.3	26.1	10984
Morocco	17.6	52.9	29.5	7883
Nigeria	20.5	52.0	27.5	9728
US	23.1	49.4	27.5	8182
Mexico	20.7	56.3	23.0	1600
UK	11.4	27.1	61.5	3016
Netherlands	22.7	38.0	39.3	8942
Spain	20.1	34.4	45.5	8075
Denmark	18.0	49.8	32.2	2017

### *Estimates wage ratios*

In line with existing studies (ISSP, 2009), our experiment asked respondents to estimate the yearly salary of the CEO of a large national company and that of an unskilled worker to

compute the estimated pay ratio between the top and the bottom of the wage distribution. Following from this we asked respondents to indicate how much they think these two professions should earn per year, which allows us to calculate the preferred pay ratio (see Table A4). In two countries in the sample, the UK and Denmark this question was asked to the whole panel of respondents, whereas in the other countries it was an add-on question after the field experiment. Because wages are difficult to estimate, and outliers bias averages, we use the median to compute the ratios shown in the table below. We find that respondents consistently want CEO to worker pay ratios to decrease. With the exception of Nigeria, the preferred pay ratio is usually at least half of the estimated ratio, and in many cases much less.

Table A4: Estimated and preferred top to bottom wage ratios

	<b>Estimated CEO to worker ratio</b>	<b>Preferred CEO to worker ratio</b>
<b>Spain</b>	4.3	1.8
<b>India</b>	62.5	13.9
<b>Morocco</b>	5.6	2.7
<b>Nigeria</b>	6.7	4.8
<b>Netherlands</b>	27.8	9.2
<b>US</b>	25.0	5.8
<b>South Africa</b>	27.8	9.2
<b>Denmark</b>	8.5	4.0
<b>UK</b>	33.0	7.0
<b>Mexico</b>	7.1	1.7

Wage ratios are a proxy for relative income inequality and such capture existing perceptions. It is worth noting that most data that is available on this topic point to wage ratios much higher than what people believe them to be. For example, according to Bloomberg research<sup>1</sup>, in Spain and the Netherlands this ratio is closer to 170:1, in the US it is 299:1 and in South Africa 540:1.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/best-worst-countries-rich-ceo/>

## APPENDIX E – BALANCE TABLES

United Kingdom		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Over 55 years	1005	0.394	1007	0.375	1004	0.393	0.019	0.001	-0.018
		[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Share of males	1005	0.473	1007	0.471	1004	0.472	0.002	0.001	-0.001
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.016]			
In South East England	1005	0.329	1007	0.351	1004	0.362	-0.021	-0.032	-0.011
		[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Have university degree	1005	0.383	1007	0.379	1004	0.375	0.004	0.009	0.005
		[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Voted Leave in EU referendum	1005	0.426	1007	0.398	1004	0.430	0.028	-0.004	-0.032
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.016]			
Voted Conservative in General Election	1005	0.309	1007	0.334	1004	0.352	-0.024	-0.042**	-0.018
		[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Voted Labour in General Election	1005	0.374	1007	0.356	1004	0.351	0.019	0.024	0.005
		[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Household income over 40k GBP	1005	0.472	1007	0.496	1004	0.444	-0.024	0.027	0.051**
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.016]			
Per capita income over 20k GBP	1005	0.423	1007	0.449	1004	0.424	-0.026	-0.001	0.025
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.016]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	936	0.460	953	0.442	951	0.452	0.019	0.008	-0.010
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.016]			
Overestimate income place	936	0.322	953	0.300	951	0.330	0.021	-0.009	-0.030
		[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.015]			

Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	1005	0.421	1007	0.423	1004	0.416	-0.002	0.005	0.007
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.016]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	1005	0.205	1007	0.190	1004	0.191	0.015	0.014	-0.002
		[0.013]		[0.012]		[0.012]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	1005	0.117	1007	0.108	1004	0.116	0.009	0.002	-0.007
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	1005	0.092	1007	0.104	1004	0.101	-0.013	-0.009	0.004
		[0.009]		[0.010]		[0.009]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	1005	0.086	1007	0.083	1004	0.094	0.002	-0.008	-0.010
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	1005	0.080	1007	0.091	1004	0.083	-0.012	-0.003	0.009
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	1005	0.053	1007	0.058	1004	0.061	-0.005	-0.008	-0.003
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.008]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	1005	0.031	1007	0.042	1004	0.054	-0.011	-0.023**	-0.012
		[0.005]		[0.006]		[0.007]			
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	1005	0.092	1007	0.084	1004	0.095	0.007	-0.003	-0.010
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Less unequal (should be distributed)	1005	0.100	1007	0.118	1004	0.097	-0.019	0.003	0.022
		[0.009]		[0.010]		[0.009]			
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	1005	0.232	1007	0.238	1004	0.228	-0.006	0.004	0.010
		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.013]			
Completely equal (should be distributed)	1005	0.494	1007	0.460	1004	0.466	0.034	0.027	-0.006
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.016]			
Perceived place (1)	936	0.118	953	0.129	951	0.106	-0.012	0.011	0.023
		[0.011]		[0.011]		[0.010]			
Perceived place (2)	936	0.343	953	0.313	951	0.346	0.030	-0.003	-0.033

		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Perceived place (3)	936	0.487	953	0.486	951	0.476	0.001	0.011	0.009
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.016]			
Perceived place (4)	936	0.036	953	0.050	951	0.057	-0.014	-0.020**	-0.006
		[0.006]		[0.007]		[0.008]			
Perceived place (5)	936	0.016	953	0.022	951	0.015	-0.006	0.001	0.007
		[0.004]		[0.005]		[0.004]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.									
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									

<b>Denmark</b>		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Treatment A		Control	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
Over 55 years	1007	0.340	1010	0.321	0.019
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
Share of males	1007	0.514	1010	0.484	0.030
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
Have university degree	1007	0.581	1010	0.583	-0.002
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
In Danish capital region	1007	0.326	1010	0.309	0.017
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
Voted People's Party in General Election	1007	0.168	1010	0.175	-0.007
		[0.012]		[0.012]	
Voted Social Democrat in General Election	1007	0.198	1010	0.216	-0.018
		[0.013]		[0.013]	

Voted Other in General Election	1007	0.635	1010	0.609	0.026
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
Household income over 500k Kroner	1007	0.392	1010	0.408	-0.016
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
Perceived income in bottom 40%	1007	0.262	1010	0.267	-0.005
		[0.014]		[0.014]	
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	1007	0.142	1010	0.122	0.020
		[0.011]		[0.010]	
Very unequal (currently distributed)	1007	0.195	1010	0.186	0.008
		[0.012]		[0.012]	
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	1007	0.157	1010	0.202	-0.045***
		[0.011]		[0.013]	
Less unequal (currently distributed)	1007	0.180	1010	0.167	0.012
		[0.012]		[0.012]	
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	1007	0.186	1010	0.196	-0.010
		[0.012]		[0.012]	
Completely equal (currently distributed)	1007	0.141	1010	0.127	0.014
		[0.011]		[0.010]	
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	1007	0.068	1010	0.057	0.010
		[0.008]		[0.007]	
Very unequal (should be distributed)	1007	0.061	1010	0.072	-0.012
		[0.008]		[0.008]	
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	1007	0.149	1010	0.133	0.016
		[0.011]		[0.011]	
Less unequal (should be distributed)	1007	0.151	1010	0.158	-0.007
		[0.011]		[0.011]	
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	1007	0.252	1010	0.273	-0.021

		[0.014]		[0.014]	
Completely equal (should be distributed)	1007	0.320	1010	0.306	0.014
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
Perceived place (1)	1007	0.073	1010	0.063	0.010
		[0.008]		[0.008]	
Perceived place (2)	1007	0.189	1010	0.204	-0.015
		[0.012]		[0.013]	
Perceived place (3)	1007	0.589	1010	0.574	0.015
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
Perceived place (4)	1007	0.087	1010	0.107	-0.020
		[0.009]		[0.010]	
Perceived place (5)	1007	0.029	1010	0.017	0.012*
		[0.005]		[0.004]	
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.					
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.					

<b>United States</b>		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	5303	0.467	5356	0.475	5232	0.459	-0.008	0.007	0.015
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Share of males	5303	0.514	5356	0.535	5232	0.536	-0.021**	-0.022**	-0.001
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Urban living	938	0.536	1064	0.560	1093	0.541	-0.024	-0.004	0.019
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Large city living	938	0.281	1064	0.301	1093	0.283	-0.019	-0.001	0.018

		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.014]			
Have university degree	932	0.356	1062	0.390	1086	0.369	-0.034	-0.013	0.021
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Voted Democrat in presidential election	5290	0.208	5346	0.212	5223	0.211	-0.004	-0.003	0.001
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Voted Republican in presidential election	5290	0.173	5346	0.182	5223	0.179	-0.008	-0.006	0.003
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Didn't know vote in presidential election	5290	0.474	5346	0.461	5223	0.463	0.013	0.011	-0.002
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Income in bottom 40%	1792	0.664	1840	0.660	1746	0.659	0.004	0.004	0.001
		[0.011]		[0.011]		[0.011]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	2429	0.394	2483	0.364	2402	0.386	0.030**	0.009	-0.021
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	2755	0.276	2771	0.275	2657	0.275	0.002	0.001	-0.000
		[0.009]		[0.008]		[0.009]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	2755	0.237	2771	0.224	2657	0.231	0.012	0.006	-0.007
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	2755	0.174	2771	0.182	2657	0.180	-0.008	-0.006	0.002
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	2755	0.075	2771	0.072	2657	0.072	0.003	0.003	-0.000
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	2755	0.110	2771	0.119	2657	0.113	-0.009	-0.003	0.006
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	2755	0.128	2771	0.128	2657	0.129	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	2105	0.086	2134	0.075	2057	0.088	0.011	-0.002	-0.013
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			



Spain		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	4104	0.406 [0.008]	4016	0.409 [0.008]	4012	0.401 [0.008]	-0.003	0.006	0.009
Share of males	4104	0.598 [0.008]	4016	0.597 [0.008]	4011	0.592 [0.008]	0.002	0.006	0.004
Urban living	969	0.584 [0.016]	1047	0.564 [0.015]	1057	0.565 [0.015]	0.020	0.019	-0.000
Large city living	969	0.346 [0.015]	1047	0.343 [0.015]	1057	0.330 [0.014]	0.003	0.016	0.013
Have university degree	965	0.479 [0.016]	1044	0.454 [0.015]	1057	0.456 [0.015]	0.025	0.023	-0.002
Voted People's Party in general election	4104	0.096 [0.005]	4016	0.101 [0.005]	4011	0.113 [0.005]	-0.005	-0.017**	-0.012*
Voted Citizens in general election	4104	0.117 [0.005]	4016	0.123 [0.005]	4011	0.120 [0.005]	-0.006	-0.003	0.003
Income in bottom 40%	1527	0.507 [0.013]	1573	0.508 [0.013]	1493	0.527 [0.013]	-0.001	-0.020	-0.019
Perceived income in bottom 40%	2357	0.358 [0.010]	2378	0.337 [0.010]	2296	0.337 [0.010]	0.021	0.021	0.001
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	2741	0.194 [0.008]	2703	0.213 [0.008]	2676	0.190 [0.008]	-0.020*	0.004	0.023**
Very unequal (currently distributed)	2741	0.262 [0.008]	2703	0.248 [0.008]	2676	0.259 [0.008]	0.013	0.003	-0.010
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	2741	0.202	2703	0.190	2676	0.210	0.012	-0.008	-0.021*

		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	2741	0.099	2703	0.094	2676	0.103	0.005	-0.004	-0.009
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	2741	0.095	2703	0.102	2676	0.106	-0.007	-0.011	-0.004
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	2741	0.148	2703	0.153	2676	0.132	-0.004	0.017*	0.021**
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	2002	0.079	2054	0.093	1958	0.087	-0.014	-0.008	0.006
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	2002	0.085	2054	0.078	1958	0.074	0.008	0.011	0.004
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	2002	0.143	2054	0.155	1958	0.166	-0.012	-0.024**	-0.012
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Less unequal (should be distributed)	2002	0.163	2054	0.175	1958	0.161	-0.012	0.001	0.013
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	2002	0.212	2054	0.193	1958	0.194	0.019	0.018	-0.001
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Completely equal (should be distributed)	2002	0.318	2054	0.306	1958	0.317	0.012	0.002	-0.010
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.011]			
Perceived place (1)	2357	0.139	2378	0.117	2296	0.117	0.022**	0.022**	0.000
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Perceived place (2)	2357	0.219	2378	0.220	2296	0.220	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Perceived place (3)	2357	0.482	2378	0.497	2296	0.496	-0.016	-0.014	0.002
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Perceived place (4)	2357	0.094	2378	0.096	2296	0.106	-0.002	-0.012	-0.010
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			

Perceived place (5)	2357	0.066	2378	0.069	2296	0.062	-0.003	0.004	0.008
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Overestimate income place	1527	0.547	1573	0.575	1493	0.587	-0.028	-0.040**	-0.012
		[0.013]		[0.012]		[0.013]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.									
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									

<b>Netherlands</b>		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	5251	0.468	5394	0.455	5347	0.463	0.012	0.005	-0.007
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Share of males	5251	0.599	5394	0.592	5347	0.603	0.006	-0.005	-0.011
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Urban living	884	0.509	1094	0.473	1078	0.504	0.036	0.005	-0.031
		[0.017]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Large city living	884	0.317	1094	0.288	1078	0.294	0.029	0.023	-0.006
		[0.016]		[0.014]		[0.014]			
Have post-secondary education	886	0.595	1094	0.610	1074	0.609	-0.015	-0.014	0.001
		[0.017]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	2608	0.260	2652	0.268	2571	0.263	-0.009	-0.003	0.006
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Income in bottom 40%	1775	0.530	1848	0.544	1716	0.548	-0.015	-0.019	-0.004
		[0.012]		[0.012]		[0.012]			
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	2953	0.158	3029	0.159	2960	0.165	-0.001	-0.007	-0.005

		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	2953	0.242	3029	0.219	2960	0.235	0.023**	0.007	-0.016
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	2953	0.212	3029	0.240	2960	0.229	-0.027**	-0.017	0.011
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	2953	0.133	3029	0.131	2960	0.127	0.002	0.006	0.004
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	2953	0.124	3029	0.111	2960	0.113	0.013	0.012	-0.002
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	2953	0.131	3029	0.140	2960	0.132	-0.009	-0.001	0.008
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	2247	0.085	2279	0.090	2203	0.090	-0.005	-0.005	-0.000
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	2247	0.111	2279	0.113	2203	0.115	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	2247	0.205	2279	0.201	2203	0.202	0.003	0.002	-0.001
		[0.009]		[0.008]		[0.009]			
Less unequal (should be distributed)	2247	0.217	2279	0.215	2203	0.200	0.003	0.017	0.015
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	2247	0.173	2279	0.168	2203	0.178	0.005	-0.005	-0.010
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Completely equal (should be distributed)	2247	0.209	2279	0.213	2203	0.215	-0.004	-0.006	-0.001
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Perceived place (1)	2608	0.109	2652	0.113	2571	0.110	-0.004	-0.001	0.003
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Perceived place (2)	2608	0.151	2652	0.155	2571	0.153	-0.005	-0.003	0.002
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			

Perceived place (3)	2608	0.558	2652	0.541	2571	0.550	0.017	0.008	-0.009
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Perceived place (4)	2608	0.082	2652	0.097	2571	0.090	-0.014*	-0.007	0.007
		[0.005]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Perceived place (5)	2608	0.100	2652	0.094	2571	0.097	0.007	0.003	-0.003
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Overestimate income place	1775	0.456	1848	0.479	1716	0.480	-0.024	-0.024	-0.000
		[0.012]		[0.012]		[0.012]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.									
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									

<b>Nigeria</b>		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	5593	0.786	5530	0.792	5568	0.790	-0.005	-0.004	0.001
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Share of males	5593	0.732	5530	0.697	5568	0.718	0.035***	0.014*	-0.021**
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Urban living	926	0.663	1044	0.666	1119	0.660	-0.003	0.004	0.006
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.014]			
Large city living	926	0.502	1044	0.485	1119	0.475	0.017	0.028	0.010
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Have post-secondary education	924	0.582	1047	0.595	1114	0.592	-0.013	-0.010	0.003
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	2884	0.138	2921	0.137	2899	0.133	0.001	0.005	0.004

		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Income in bottom 40%	1730	0.720	1788	0.727	1799	0.725	-0.007	-0.006	0.001
		[0.011]		[0.011]		[0.011]			
Would vote for current government	5593	0.572	5530	0.579	5567	0.575	-0.007	-0.003	0.004
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Would not vote for current government	5593	0.226	5530	0.220	5567	0.214	0.006	0.012	0.006
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Don't know who to vote for	5593	0.161	5530	0.164	5567	0.167	-0.003	-0.006	-0.003
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	3217	0.270	3272	0.289	3253	0.267	-0.020*	0.003	0.022**
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	3217	0.210	3272	0.208	3253	0.197	0.003	0.013	0.010
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	3217	0.112	3272	0.103	3253	0.118	0.009	-0.007	-0.016**
		[0.006]		[0.005]		[0.006]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	3217	0.073	3272	0.069	3253	0.071	0.004	0.002	-0.002
		[0.005]		[0.004]		[0.005]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	3217	0.085	3272	0.087	3253	0.093	-0.002	-0.009	-0.006
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	3217	0.251	3272	0.245	3253	0.254	0.006	-0.002	-0.009
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	2168	0.128	2192	0.127	2221	0.132	0.001	-0.004	-0.006
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	2168	0.155	2192	0.175	2221	0.153	-0.020*	0.002	0.022**
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	2168	0.099	2192	0.090	2221	0.098	0.009	0.001	-0.008
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			

Less unequal (should be distributed)	2168	0.065	2192	0.068	2221	0.062	-0.003	0.003	0.006
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	2168	0.155	2192	0.164	2221	0.162	-0.008	-0.007	0.002
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Completely equal (should be distributed)	2168	0.397	2192	0.376	2221	0.393	0.021	0.005	-0.017
		[0.011]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Perceived place (1)	2884	0.043	2921	0.041	2899	0.041	0.002	0.002	-0.001
		[0.004]		[0.004]		[0.004]			
Perceived place (2)	2884	0.095	2921	0.097	2899	0.092	-0.001	0.003	0.004
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Perceived place (3)	2884	0.540	2921	0.533	2899	0.529	0.007	0.011	0.004
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Perceived place (4)	2884	0.109	2921	0.113	2899	0.117	-0.004	-0.007	-0.004
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Perceived place (5)	2884	0.213	2921	0.217	2899	0.221	-0.004	-0.009	-0.004
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Overestimate income place	1730	0.713	1788	0.732	1799	0.731	-0.019	-0.018	0.001
		[0.011]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									

<b>India</b>		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	8324	0.760	8102	0.764	8279	0.756	-0.005	0.004	0.008

		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Share of males	8324	0.739	8102	0.749	8279	0.747	-0.010	-0.008	0.002
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Urban living	949	0.632	1068	0.613	1139	0.628	0.019	0.005	-0.014
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.014]			
Large city living	949	0.393	1068	0.410	1139	0.387	-0.017	0.006	0.023
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.014]			
Have university degree	938	0.616	1060	0.581	1124	0.589	0.035	0.027	-0.008
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	3270	0.225	3139	0.206	3233	0.217	0.019*	0.008	-0.010
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Income in bottom 40%	1843	0.535	1834	0.513	1917	0.524	0.022	0.011	-0.012
		[0.012]		[0.012]		[0.011]			
Would vote for current government	6614	0.567	6456	0.547	6559	0.553	0.020**	0.014	-0.006
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Would not vote for current government	6614	0.190	6456	0.207	6559	0.204	-0.017**	-0.014**	0.004
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Don't know who to vote for	6614	0.191	6456	0.191	6559	0.192	0.000	-0.001	-0.002
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	3709	0.267	3614	0.259	3661	0.257	0.008	0.010	0.002
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	3709	0.187	3614	0.183	3661	0.186	0.004	0.001	-0.003
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	3709	0.163	3614	0.169	3661	0.163	-0.006	-0.000	0.005
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	3709	0.088	3614	0.099	3661	0.104	-0.011	-0.015**	-0.004
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			

Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	3709	0.101	3614	0.099	3661	0.095	0.002	0.006	0.004
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	3709	0.194	3614	0.191	3661	0.196	0.003	-0.001	-0.004
		[0.006]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	2431	0.106	2367	0.109	2442	0.102	-0.003	0.003	0.007
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	2431	0.137	2367	0.132	2442	0.128	0.006	0.009	0.004
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	2431	0.169	2367	0.154	2442	0.162	0.015	0.006	-0.008
		[0.008]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Less unequal (should be distributed)	2431	0.119	2367	0.128	2442	0.130	-0.009	-0.011	-0.002
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	2431	0.188	2367	0.197	2442	0.191	-0.009	-0.004	0.006
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Completely equal (should be distributed)	2431	0.282	2367	0.281	2442	0.286	0.001	-0.004	-0.006
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Perceived place (1)	3270	0.089	3139	0.079	3233	0.093	0.010	-0.004	-0.014**
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Perceived place (2)	3270	0.136	3139	0.127	3233	0.124	0.009	0.012	0.003
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Perceived place (3)	3270	0.609	3139	0.622	3233	0.614	-0.013	-0.006	0.007
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Perceived place (4)	3270	0.095	3139	0.093	3233	0.100	0.002	-0.004	-0.007
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Perceived place (5)	3270	0.071	3139	0.079	3233	0.070	-0.008	0.002	0.010
		[0.004]		[0.005]		[0.004]			
Overestimate income place	1843	0.617	1834	0.596	1917	0.603	0.021	0.014	-0.007

		[0.011]		[0.011]		[0.011]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.									
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									

South Africa		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	5417	0.703	5269	0.711	5280	0.706	-0.007	-0.003	0.005
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Share of males	5417	0.609	5269	0.602	5280	0.629	0.006	-0.020**	-0.026***
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Urban living	967	0.481	1028	0.480	1069	0.524	0.001	-0.043*	-0.044**
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.015]			
Large city living	967	0.217	1028	0.201	1069	0.218	0.016	-0.001	-0.017
		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.013]			
Have post-secondary education	969	0.458	1028	0.422	1072	0.456	0.036	0.002	-0.034
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	2679	0.359	2623	0.350	2628	0.330	0.009	0.030**	0.020
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Income in bottom 40%	1754	0.732	1710	0.749	1679	0.725	-0.016	0.007	0.023
		[0.011]		[0.010]		[0.011]			
Would vote for current government	5417	0.398	5268	0.413	5280	0.407	-0.014	-0.008	0.006
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Would not vote for current government	5417	0.315	5268	0.314	5280	0.318	0.000	-0.003	-0.003
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			

Don't know who to vote for	5417	0.208	5268	0.202	5280	0.208	0.006	-0.000	-0.007
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	2983	0.290	2912	0.287	2928	0.277	0.004	0.013	0.009
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	2983	0.225	2912	0.220	2928	0.218	0.005	0.007	0.003
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	2983	0.150	2912	0.152	2928	0.159	-0.002	-0.009	-0.007
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	2983	0.092	2912	0.090	2928	0.085	0.002	0.007	0.005
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	2983	0.085	2912	0.090	2928	0.088	-0.004	-0.003	0.001
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	2983	0.158	2912	0.162	2928	0.172	-0.004	-0.015	-0.011
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	2194	0.101	2121	0.111	2163	0.102	-0.010	-0.001	0.009
		[0.006]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	2194	0.134	2121	0.145	2163	0.139	-0.011	-0.006	0.006
		[0.007]		[0.008]		[0.007]			
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	2194	0.124	2121	0.124	2163	0.143	0.001	-0.019*	-0.020*
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.008]			
Less unequal (should be distributed)	2194	0.090	2121	0.101	2163	0.093	-0.011	-0.003	0.008
		[0.006]		[0.007]		[0.006]			
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	2194	0.202	2121	0.174	2163	0.178	0.027**	0.024**	-0.003
		[0.009]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Completely equal (should be distributed)	2194	0.349	2121	0.346	2163	0.344	0.003	0.004	0.001
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Perceived place (1)	2679	0.131	2623	0.133	2628	0.118	-0.003	0.012	0.015*

		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.006]			
Perceived place (2)	2679	0.229	2623	0.217	2628	0.212	0.012	0.017	0.005
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Perceived place (3)	2679	0.522	2623	0.538	2628	0.547	-0.016	-0.025*	-0.009
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Perceived place (4)	2679	0.046	2623	0.047	2628	0.053	-0.001	-0.007	-0.006
		[0.004]		[0.004]		[0.004]			
Perceived place (5)	2679	0.073	2623	0.065	2628	0.070	0.008	0.003	-0.005
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Overestimate income place	1754	0.590	1710	0.601	1679	0.604	-0.011	-0.014	-0.003
		[0.012]		[0.012]		[0.012]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.									
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									

<b>Morocco</b>		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	4287	0.646	4226	0.652	4259	0.632	-0.006	0.014	0.020*
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Share of males	4287	0.700	4226	0.696	4259	0.682	0.004	0.018*	0.014
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Urban living	915	0.736	1051	0.749	1060	0.752	-0.013	-0.016	-0.003
		[0.015]		[0.013]		[0.013]			
Large city living	915	0.600	1051	0.596	1060	0.588	0.004	0.012	0.008
		[0.016]		[0.015]		[0.015]			

Have post-secondary education	912	0.789	1050	0.779	1062	0.762	0.010	0.028	0.017
		[0.014]		[0.013]		[0.013]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	2373	0.369	2280	0.387	2366	0.385	-0.018	-0.016	0.001
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Income in bottom 40%	1552	0.771	1525	0.768	1540	0.779	0.003	-0.009	-0.011
		[0.011]		[0.011]		[0.011]			
Would vote for current government	4287	0.278	4226	0.280	4259	0.279	-0.002	-0.002	0.001
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Would not vote for current government	4287	0.292	4226	0.305	4259	0.290	-0.013	0.001	0.015
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Don't know who to vote for	4287	0.263	4226	0.265	4259	0.269	-0.001	-0.005	-0.004
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	2659	0.295	2567	0.301	2672	0.288	-0.006	0.007	0.013
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	2659	0.171	2567	0.169	2672	0.188	0.002	-0.016	-0.018*
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.008]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	2659	0.159	2567	0.180	2672	0.156	-0.021**	0.003	0.024**
		[0.007]		[0.008]		[0.007]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	2659	0.095	2567	0.099	2672	0.095	-0.003	0.000	0.003
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	2659	0.111	2567	0.105	2672	0.119	0.006	-0.008	-0.015*
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	2659	0.168	2567	0.147	2672	0.154	0.022**	0.015	-0.007
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	1989	0.122	1917	0.125	1978	0.149	-0.003	-0.026**	-0.023**
		[0.007]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	1989	0.108	1917	0.104	1978	0.106	0.004	0.002	-0.002



<b>Mexico</b>		(1)		(2)		(3)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	3489	0.620	3414	0.613	3403	0.614	0.007	0.006	-0.001
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Share of males	3489	0.587	3414	0.588	3403	0.585	-0.001	0.002	0.003
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Urban living	723	0.602	853	0.594	857	0.597	0.007	0.004	-0.003
		[0.018]		[0.017]		[0.017]			
Have university degree	721	0.394	848	0.370	858	0.392	0.024	0.002	-0.021
		[0.018]		[0.017]		[0.017]			
Perceived income in bottom 40%	2881	0.280	2851	0.270	2873	0.286	0.010	-0.006	-0.016
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Income in bottom 40%	1489	0.769	1433	0.761	1439	0.761	0.008	0.008	-0.000
		[0.011]		[0.011]		[0.011]			
Would vote for current government	1030	0.118	1139	0.112	1238	0.120	0.007	-0.002	-0.009
		[0.010]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Would not vote for current government	1030	0.666	1139	0.639	1238	0.674	0.027	-0.008	-0.035*
		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.013]			
Extremely unequal (currently distributed)	3489	0.228	3414	0.237	3403	0.225	-0.009	0.002	0.011
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Very unequal (currently distributed)	3489	0.204	3414	0.206	3403	0.212	-0.002	-0.008	-0.006
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Somewhat unequal (currently distributed)	3489	0.132	3414	0.136	3403	0.138	-0.004	-0.006	-0.002
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Less unequal (currently distributed)	3489	0.075	3414	0.075	3403	0.062	0.000	0.014**	0.013**
		[0.004]		[0.005]		[0.004]			
Somewhat equal (currently distributed)	3489	0.124	3414	0.118	3403	0.116	0.007	0.009	0.002

		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.005]			
Completely equal (currently distributed)	3489	0.237	3414	0.228	3403	0.248	0.008	-0.011	-0.019*
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Extremely unequal (should be distributed)	2342	0.103	2286	0.105	2331	0.095	-0.003	0.008	0.011
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Very unequal (should be distributed)	2342	0.123	2286	0.121	2331	0.119	0.003	0.005	0.002
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Somewhat unequal (should be distributed)	2342	0.094	2286	0.107	2331	0.127	-0.013	-0.033***	-0.021**
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.007]			
Less unequal (should be distributed)	2342	0.075	2286	0.076	2331	0.069	-0.001	0.006	0.007
		[0.005]		[0.006]		[0.005]			
Somewhat equal (should be distributed)	2342	0.211	2286	0.203	2331	0.207	0.008	0.004	-0.004
		[0.008]		[0.008]		[0.008]			
Completely equal (should be distributed)	2342	0.394	2286	0.389	2331	0.383	0.005	0.011	0.006
		[0.010]		[0.010]		[0.010]			
Perceived place (1)	2881	0.108	2851	0.105	2873	0.104	0.004	0.004	0.000
		[0.006]		[0.006]		[0.006]			
Perceived place (2)	2881	0.172	2851	0.166	2873	0.182	0.007	-0.010	-0.017*
		[0.007]		[0.007]		[0.007]			
Perceived place (3)	2881	0.553	2851	0.555	2873	0.550	-0.003	0.003	0.005
		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]			
Perceived place (4)	2881	0.078	2851	0.078	2873	0.076	-0.000	0.003	0.003
		[0.005]		[0.005]		[0.005]			
Perceived place (5)	2881	0.089	2851	0.096	2873	0.088	-0.008	0.001	0.008
		[0.005]		[0.006]		[0.005]			
Overestimate income place	1489	0.688	1433	0.683	1439	0.689	0.005	-0.000	-0.005
		[0.012]		[0.012]		[0.012]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.									

***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									
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Indonesia		(2)		(3)		(4)	t-test	t-test	t-test
		Treatment A		Treatment B		Control	(2)-(3)	(2)-(4)	(3)-(4)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	Difference	Difference
Under 35 years	923	0.275	936	0.257	906	0.267	0.018	0.008	-0.010
		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.015]			
Share of males	923	0.490	936	0.496	906	0.471	-0.006	0.018	0.024
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.017]			
Large city living	923	0.485	936	0.475	906	0.494	0.010	-0.009	-0.019
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.017]			
Have university degree	923	0.528	936	0.504	906	0.539	0.023	-0.011	-0.034
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.017]			
Income in bottom 40%	923	0.321	936	0.338	906	0.338	-0.017	-0.017	-0.000
		[0.015]		[0.015]		[0.016]			
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.									
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.									

**APPENDIX F – CO-EFFICIENTS OF ORDERED LOGIT REGRESSIONS ON THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON EACH QUESTION**

	ATTITUDES TOWARDS INEQUALITY						PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION					
	Gap			Difficult			Urgent			Responsibility		
	(1)	(2a)	(2b)	(1)	(2a)	(2b)	(1)	(2a)	(2b)	(1)	(2a)	(2b)
Indonesia	0.178**			0.217**								
South Africa		-0.169*	-0.289**	0.180**			0.313***					
Nigeria		-0.373***										0.382**
Morocco		-0.155*	-0.235**	0.175*								
India		-0.235***	-0.187*									
Mexico		-0.243**										
Denmark	0.182**			0.160*			0.171**			0.180**		
UK	0.330***			0.277***			0.266***			0.297***		
US	-0.129*		0.379***						-0.236**	-0.233***	-0.263**	-0.222**
Netherlands		-0.155*		0.178**		0.217*						
Spain	-0.146**	-0.288***				-0.271*						

\*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

(1) Effect from information about inequality and mobility

(2a) Effect from information about position in distribution (among those who overestimated)

(2b) Effect from information about position in distribution (among those who under or accurately estimated)

## APPENDIX G – RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSIONS ON THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ON EACH OPTION TO EACH QUESTION

Note that for all of the following tables:

The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.

\*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

(A) Effect from information about inequality and mobility

(B1) Effect from information about position in distribution (among those who overestimated)

(B2) Effect from information about position in distribution (among those who under or accurately estimated)

India	(1)					(2)					(1)					(2)				
	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	t-test (1)-(2)	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	t-test (1)-(2)	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	t-test (1)-(2)					
GAP - Strongly agree	1791	0.442	1420	0.446	-0.004	1067	0.418	934	0.375	0.043**	724	0.478	653	0.417	0.061**					
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.016]			[0.019]		[0.019]						
GAP - Agree	1791	0.394	1420	0.388	0.006	1067	0.439	934	0.434	0.005	724	0.329	653	0.380	-0.051**					
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.016]			[0.017]		[0.019]						
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1791	0.095	1420	0.080	0.015	1067	0.090	934	0.109	-0.019	724	0.102	653	0.110	-0.008					
		[0.007]		[0.007]			[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.012]						
GAP - Disagree	1791	0.039	1420	0.046	-0.007	1067	0.037	934	0.056	-0.019**	724	0.043	653	0.049	-0.006					
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.006]		[0.008]			[0.008]		[0.008]						
GAP - Strongly disagree	1791	0.030	1420	0.041	-0.011*	1067	0.017	934	0.027	-0.010	724	0.048	653	0.044	0.004					
		[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.008]		[0.008]						
DIFFICULT - Easy	1683	0.310	1341	0.307	0.002	1011	0.336	882	0.342	-0.006	672	0.269	622	0.277	-0.007					
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.016]			[0.017]		[0.018]						
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1683	0.468	1341	0.468	0.000	1011	0.452	882	0.435	0.017	672	0.491	622	0.494	-0.002					
		[0.012]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.019]		[0.020]						

DIFFICULT - Impossible	1683	0.063	1341	0.063	-0.000	1011	0.053	882	0.066	-0.012	672	0.077	622	0.055	0.023
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.010]		[0.009]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1683	0.160	1341	0.162	-0.002	1011	0.158	882	0.156	0.002	672	0.162	622	0.175	-0.013
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.014]		[0.015]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1375	0.401	1127	0.422	-0.022	819	0.405	722	0.435	-0.030	556	0.394	519	0.401	-0.007
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.017]		[0.018]			[0.021]		[0.022]	
URGENT - Urgently	1375	0.332	1127	0.307	0.025	819	0.325	722	0.307	0.017	556	0.342	519	0.355	-0.013
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.020]		[0.021]	
URGENT - Less urgently	1375	0.070	1127	0.070	-0.000	819	0.066	722	0.054	0.012	556	0.076	519	0.067	0.008
		[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.009]		[0.008]			[0.011]		[0.011]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1375	0.026	1127	0.032	-0.006	819	0.018	722	0.028	-0.009	556	0.038	519	0.033	0.005
		[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.008]		[0.008]	
URGENT - Don't know	1375	0.172	1127	0.169	0.003	819	0.186	722	0.176	0.010	556	0.151	519	0.145	0.007
		[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.015]		[0.015]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1365	0.360	1101	0.372	-0.012	821	0.364	711	0.402	-0.038	544	0.355	517	0.371	-0.017
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.017]		[0.018]			[0.021]		[0.021]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1365	0.332	1101	0.319	0.013	821	0.336	711	0.319	0.017	544	0.325	517	0.333	-0.007
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.020]		[0.021]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1365	0.116	1101	0.116	0.000	821	0.106	711	0.103	0.003	544	0.132	517	0.116	0.016
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.011]			[0.015]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1365	0.050	1101	0.042	0.008	821	0.051	711	0.042	0.009	544	0.048	517	0.062	-0.014
		[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.009]		[0.011]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1365	0.018	1101	0.022	-0.003	821	0.013	711	0.014	-0.001	544	0.026	517	0.017	0.008
		[0.004]		[0.004]			[0.004]		[0.004]			[0.007]		[0.006]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1365	0.123	1101	0.129	-0.006	821	0.129	711	0.120	0.010	544	0.114	517	0.101	0.013
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.012]		[0.012]			[0.014]		[0.013]	

Morocco															
		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B1	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B2	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1498	0.483	1234	0.469	0.013	964	0.479	894	0.450	0.030	534	0.489	507	0.424	0.065**
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.022]		[0.022]	
GAP - Agree	1498	0.286	1234	0.288	-0.001	964	0.301	894	0.293	0.008	534	0.260	507	0.284	-0.024
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.015]			[0.019]		[0.020]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1498	0.156	1234	0.160	-0.004	964	0.161	894	0.180	-0.019	534	0.146	507	0.168	-0.022
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.017]	
GAP - Disagree	1498	0.041	1234	0.042	-0.001	964	0.036	894	0.039	-0.003	534	0.051	507	0.071	-0.020
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.009]		[0.011]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	1498	0.034	1234	0.041	-0.007	964	0.023	894	0.038	-0.015*	534	0.054	507	0.053	0.001
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.010]		[0.010]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	1413	0.203	1173	0.167	0.036**	912	0.224	861	0.200	0.024	501	0.166	483	0.182	-0.017
		[0.011]		[0.011]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.017]		[0.018]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1413	0.463	1173	0.515	-0.052***	912	0.466	861	0.495	-0.029	501	0.457	483	0.466	-0.009
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.017]		[0.017]			[0.022]		[0.023]	
DIFFICULT - Impossible	1413	0.105	1173	0.106	-0.001	912	0.101	861	0.077	0.024*	501	0.112	483	0.124	-0.012
		[0.008]		[0.009]			[0.010]		[0.009]			[0.014]		[0.015]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1413	0.229	1173	0.212	0.017	912	0.209	861	0.229	-0.019	501	0.265	483	0.228	0.038
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.020]		[0.019]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1203	0.183	1008	0.183	0.000	768	0.182	757	0.192	-0.009	435	0.184	412	0.206	-0.022
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.019]		[0.020]	
URGENT - Urgently	1203	0.121	1008	0.115	0.005	768	0.121	757	0.141	-0.020	435	0.120	412	0.080	0.039*
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.016]		[0.013]	
URGENT - Less urgently	1203	0.183	1008	0.170	0.013	768	0.199	757	0.178	0.021	435	0.154	412	0.158	-0.004
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.017]		[0.018]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1203	0.268	1008	0.288	-0.020	768	0.253	757	0.246	0.007	435	0.294	412	0.296	-0.002

		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.022]		[0.023]	
URGENT - Don't know	1203	0.246	1008	0.245	0.001	768	0.245	757	0.243	0.002	435	0.248	412	0.260	-0.011
		[0.012]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.021]		[0.022]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1215	0.266	1025	0.283	-0.017	784	0.277	765	0.295	-0.019	431	0.246	419	0.308	-0.062**
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.021]		[0.023]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1215	0.267	1025	0.250	0.018	784	0.260	765	0.258	0.003	431	0.281	419	0.236	0.044
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.022]		[0.021]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1215	0.159	1025	0.154	0.005	784	0.171	765	0.161	0.010	431	0.137	419	0.167	-0.030
		[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.013]		[0.013]			[0.017]		[0.018]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1215	0.072	1025	0.069	0.002	784	0.070	765	0.072	-0.002	431	0.074	419	0.086	-0.012
		[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.009]		[0.009]			[0.013]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1215	0.049	1025	0.043	0.006	784	0.037	765	0.037	0.000	431	0.070	419	0.045	0.024
		[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.007]		[0.007]			[0.012]		[0.010]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1215	0.188	1025	0.201	-0.013	784	0.185	765	0.178	0.007	431	0.193	419	0.158	0.035
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.019]		[0.018]	

<b>Netherlands</b>															
		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B1	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B2	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1605	0.234	1242	0.250	-0.016	772	0.263	753	0.248	0.015	832	0.207	846	0.234	-0.027
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.014]		[0.015]	
GAP - Agree	1605	0.348	1242	0.331	0.017	772	0.416	753	0.382	0.033	832	0.285	846	0.279	0.006
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.018]		[0.018]			[0.016]		[0.015]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1605	0.218	1242	0.196	0.022	772	0.194	753	0.218	-0.023	832	0.239	846	0.243	-0.004
		[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.015]		[0.015]	
GAP - Disagree	1605	0.098	1242	0.130	-0.031***	772	0.087	753	0.104	-0.017	832	0.109	846	0.109	0.001
		[0.007]		[0.010]			[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.011]		[0.011]	

GAP - Strongly disagree	1605	0.102	1242	0.093	0.009	772	0.040	753	0.048	-0.008	832	0.160	846	0.135	0.025
		-		[0.008]			[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.013]		[0.012]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	1458	0.224	1144	0.193	0.031*	699	0.212	689	0.190	0.022	758	0.236	773	0.180	0.056***
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.015]		[0.015]			[0.015]		[0.014]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1458	0.444	1144	0.420	0.023	699	0.502	689	0.434	0.068**	758	0.389	773	0.362	0.027
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.019]		[0.019]			[0.018]		[0.017]	
DIFFICULT - Impossible	1458	0.109	1144	0.128	-0.019	699	0.090	689	0.093	-0.003	758	0.127	773	0.133	-0.007
		[0.008]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.011]			[0.012]		[0.012]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1458	0.223	1144	0.259	-0.036**	699	0.196	689	0.283	-0.087***	758	0.248	773	0.325	-0.077***
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.017]			[0.016]		[0.017]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1253	0.183	995	0.197	-0.014	589	0.217	585	0.193	0.024	663	0.152	653	0.168	-0.016
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.017]		[0.016]			[0.014]		[0.015]	
URGENT - Urgently	1253	0.323	995	0.307	0.017	589	0.338	585	0.337	0.001	663	0.309	653	0.239	0.070***
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.020]		[0.020]			[0.018]		[0.017]	
URGENT - Less urgently	1253	0.173	995	0.175	-0.002	589	0.156	585	0.161	-0.004	663	0.189	653	0.181	0.008
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.015]		[0.015]			[0.015]		[0.015]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1253	0.097	995	0.086	0.010	589	0.065	585	0.053	0.012	663	0.125	653	0.107	0.018
		[0.008]		[0.009]			[0.010]		[0.009]			[0.013]		[0.012]	
URGENT - Don't know	1253	0.224	995	0.235	-0.011	589	0.224	585	0.256	-0.032	663	0.225	653	0.305	-0.080***
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.017]		[0.018]			[0.016]		[0.018]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1230	0.193	986	0.189	0.005	582	0.222	591	0.191	0.030	647	0.167	653	0.156	0.011
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.017]		[0.016]			[0.015]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1230	0.286	986	0.299	-0.013	582	0.304	591	0.325	-0.021	647	0.270	653	0.236	0.035
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.019]		[0.019]			[0.017]		[0.017]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1230	0.172	986	0.171	0.000	582	0.179	591	0.171	0.008	647	0.165	653	0.176	-0.011
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.016]		[0.015]			[0.015]		[0.015]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1230	0.115	986	0.095	0.019	582	0.091	591	0.074	0.017	647	0.136	653	0.126	0.010
		[0.009]		[0.009]			[0.012]		[0.011]			[0.013]		[0.013]	

RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1230	0.054	986	0.048	0.007	582	0.031	591	0.034	-0.003	647	0.076	653	0.069	0.007
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.007]		[0.007]			[0.010]		[0.010]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1230	0.180	986	0.198	-0.018	582	0.174	591	0.205	-0.031	647	0.185	653	0.237	-0.052**
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.015]		[0.017]	

<b>Nigeria</b>		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B1	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B2	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1712	0.593	1452	0.569	0.024	1252	0.611	1193	0.535	0.076***	460	0.543	442	0.541	0.003
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.023]		[0.024]	
GAP - Agree	1712	0.325	1452	0.341	-0.016	1252	0.311	1193	0.324	-0.014	460	0.363	442	0.305	0.058*
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.022]		[0.022]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1712	0.047	1452	0.053	-0.006	1252	0.047	1193	0.055	-0.008	460	0.046	442	0.063	-0.018
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.010]		[0.012]	
GAP - Disagree	1712	0.019	1452	0.021	-0.002	1252	0.018	1193	0.061	-0.044***	460	0.022	442	0.038	-0.017
		[0.003]		[0.004]			[0.004]		[0.007]			[0.007]		[0.009]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	1712	0.017	1452	0.017	0.000	1252	0.014	1193	0.024	-0.011*	460	0.026	442	0.052	-0.026*
		[0.003]		[0.003]			[0.003]		[0.004]			[0.007]		[0.011]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	1627	0.366	1373	0.373	-0.007	1194	0.371	1128	0.355	0.016	433	0.351	424	0.361	-0.010
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.023]		[0.023]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1627	0.459	1373	0.476	-0.016	1194	0.464	1128	0.471	-0.007	433	0.446	424	0.462	-0.017
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.024]		[0.024]	
DIFFICULT - Impossible	1627	0.049	1373	0.035	0.014*	1194	0.044	1128	0.041	0.004	433	0.062	424	0.050	0.013
		[0.005]		[0.005]			[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.012]		[0.011]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1627	0.126	1373	0.117	0.009	1194	0.121	1128	0.133	-0.012	433	0.141	424	0.127	0.014
		[0.008]		[0.009]			[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.017]		[0.016]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1311	0.606	1091	0.597	0.010	965	0.622	914	0.600	0.022	346	0.564	330	0.600	-0.036

		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.027]		[0.027]	
URGENT - Urgently	1311	0.241	1091	0.247	-0.006	965	0.244	914	0.261	-0.018	346	0.234	330	0.258	-0.023
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.023]		[0.024]	
URGENT - Less urgently	1311	0.056	1091	0.047	0.010	965	0.057	914	0.036	0.021**	346	0.055	330	0.042	0.012
		[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.007]		[0.006]			[0.012]		[0.011]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1311	0.038	1091	0.038	-0.000	965	0.034	914	0.032	0.002	346	0.049	330	0.021	0.028*
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.012]		[0.008]	
URGENT - Don't know	1311	0.058	1091	0.071	-0.013	965	0.044	914	0.071	-0.028***	346	0.098	330	0.079	0.019
		[0.006]		[0.008]			[0.007]		[0.009]			[0.016]		[0.015]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1308	0.469	1092	0.476	-0.007	963	0.485	931	0.461	0.024	345	0.426	333	0.523	-0.096*
		[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.027]		[0.027]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1308	0.300	1092	0.313	-0.013	963	0.299	931	0.333	-0.034	345	0.301	333	0.273	0.028
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.015]		[0.015]			[0.025]		[0.024]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1308	0.097	1092	0.076	0.021*	963	0.096	931	0.064	0.031**	345	0.101	333	0.078	0.023
		[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.009]		[0.008]			[0.016]		[0.015]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1308	0.058	1092	0.065	-0.007	963	0.055	931	0.060	-0.005	345	0.067	333	0.039	0.028
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.013]		[0.011]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1308	0.018	1092	0.018	-0.001	963	0.017	931	0.019	-0.003	345	0.020	333	0.021	-0.001
		[0.004]		[0.004]			[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.008]		[0.008]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1308	0.058	1092	0.051	0.007	963	0.049	931	0.062	-0.013	345	0.084	333	0.066	0.018
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.015]		[0.014]	

<b>South Africa</b>		(1)	(2)	t-test	(1)	(2)	t-test	(1)	(2)	t-test	(1)	(2)	t-test		
		Control	Treatment A	(1)-(2)	Control	Treatment B1	(1)-(2)	Control	Treatment B2	(1)-(2)	Control	Treatment B2	(1)-(2)		
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1588	0.523	1376	0.538	956	0.499	885	0.471	632	0.560	619	0.493	0.067**		
		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.016]		[0.017]		[0.020]		[0.020]			

GAP - Agree	1588	0.351	1376	0.318	0.033*	956	0.386	885	0.371	0.015	632	0.297	619	0.317	-0.019
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.018]		[0.019]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1588	0.079	1376	0.086	-0.007	956	0.074	885	0.101	-0.026**	632	0.087	619	0.110	-0.023
		[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.008]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.013]	
GAP - Disagree	1588	0.025	1376	0.029	-0.005	956	0.027	885	0.031	-0.003	632	0.021	619	0.044	-0.023**
		[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.006]		[0.008]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	1588	0.022	1376	0.029	-0.007	956	0.014	885	0.027	-0.014**	632	0.035	619	0.037	-0.002
		[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.007]		[0.008]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	1495	0.251	1307	0.223	0.027*	899	0.283	841	0.296	-0.014	596	0.203	585	0.236	-0.033
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.015]		[0.016]			[0.016]		[0.018]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1495	0.529	1307	0.523	0.006	899	0.511	841	0.460	0.050**	596	0.557	585	0.484	0.073**
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.017]		[0.017]			[0.020]		[0.021]	
DIFFICULT - Impossible	1495	0.080	1307	0.102	-0.021**	899	0.071	841	0.082	-0.011	596	0.094	585	0.111	-0.017
		[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.009]		[0.009]			[0.012]		[0.013]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1495	0.140	1307	0.151	-0.012	899	0.136	841	0.162	-0.026	596	0.146	585	0.169	-0.023
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.016]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1243	0.473	1104	0.546	-0.073***	729	0.450	677	0.482	-0.032	514	0.506	503	0.505	0.001
		[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.018]		[0.019]			[0.022]		[0.022]	
URGENT - Urgently	1243	0.317	1104	0.242	0.075***	729	0.331	677	0.292	0.038	514	0.298	503	0.288	0.009
		[0.013]		[0.013]			[0.017]		[0.017]			[0.020]		[0.020]	
URGENT - Less urgently	1243	0.060	1104	0.050	0.011	729	0.066	677	0.069	-0.004	514	0.053	503	0.046	0.007
		[0.007]		[0.007]			[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.010]		[0.009]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1243	0.041	1104	0.044	-0.003	729	0.036	677	0.038	-0.003	514	0.049	503	0.050	-0.001
		[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.007]		[0.007]			[0.009]		[0.010]	
URGENT - Don't know	1243	0.109	1104	0.118	-0.009	729	0.118	677	0.118	-0.000	514	0.095	503	0.111	-0.016
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.012]		[0.012]			[0.013]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1243	0.356	1088	0.375	-0.019	731	0.365	688	0.387	-0.021	512	0.344	495	0.400	-0.056*
		[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.018]		[0.019]			[0.021]		[0.022]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1243	0.330	1088	0.298	0.032*	731	0.335	688	0.288	0.047*	512	0.322	495	0.269	0.054*

		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.017]		[0.017]			[0.021]		[0.020]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1243	0.130	1088	0.147	-0.017	731	0.116	688	0.141	-0.025	512	0.150	495	0.156	-0.005
		[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.016]		[0.016]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1243	0.078	1088	0.075	0.003	731	0.085	688	0.076	0.009	512	0.068	495	0.069	-0.000
		[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.010]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.011]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1243	0.028	1088	0.024	0.004	731	0.014	688	0.020	-0.007	512	0.049	495	0.034	0.014
		[0.005]		[0.005]			[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.010]		[0.008]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1243	0.077	1088	0.081	-0.004	731	0.085	688	0.089	-0.004	512	0.066	495	0.073	-0.006
		[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.011]		[0.012]	

<b>Spain</b>		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1428	0.410	1250	0.371	0.038**	844	0.438	805	0.393	0.046*	584	0.368	590	0.392	-0.023
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.017]		[0.017]			[0.020]		[0.020]	
GAP - Agree	1428	0.320	1250	0.334	-0.014	844	0.341	805	0.307	0.034	584	0.289	590	0.251	0.039
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.019]		[0.018]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1428	0.175	1250	0.189	-0.014	844	0.164	805	0.204	-0.040**	584	0.192	590	0.178	0.014
		[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.016]		[0.016]	
GAP - Disagree	1428	0.054	1250	0.057	-0.003	844	0.037	805	0.063	-0.027**	584	0.079	590	0.092	-0.013
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.006]		[0.009]			[0.011]		[0.012]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	1428	0.041	1250	0.050	-0.008	844	0.020	805	0.034	-0.013*	584	0.072	590	0.088	-0.016
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.011]		[0.012]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	1370	0.108	1220	0.101	0.007	803	0.105	777	0.102	0.003	567	0.113	568	0.127	-0.014
		[0.008]		[0.009]			[0.011]		[0.011]			[0.013]		[0.014]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1370	0.553	1220	0.522	0.031	803	0.605	777	0.552	0.053**	567	0.480	568	0.454	0.025
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.017]		[0.018]			[0.021]		[0.021]	

DIFFICULT - Impossible	1370	0.127	1220	0.116	0.011	803	0.110	777	0.098	0.012	567	0.152	568	0.109	0.043**
		[0.009]		[0.009]			[0.011]		[0.011]			[0.015]		[0.013]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1370	0.212	1220	0.261	-0.049***	803	0.181	777	0.248	-0.068***	567	0.256	568	0.310	-0.054**
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.016]			[0.018]		[0.019]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1173	0.332	1081	0.307	0.025	682	0.337	663	0.339	-0.002	491	0.324	496	0.304	0.019
		[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.018]		[0.018]			[0.021]		[0.021]	
URGENT - Urgently	1173	0.344	1081	0.326	0.018	682	0.367	663	0.353	0.014	491	0.312	496	0.284	0.027
		[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.018]		[0.019]			[0.021]		[0.020]	
URGENT - Less urgently	1173	0.066	1081	0.060	0.006	682	0.048	663	0.065	-0.016	491	0.090	496	0.054	0.035**
		[0.007]		[0.007]			[0.008]		[0.010]			[0.013]		[0.010]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1173	0.032	1081	0.049	-0.017**	682	0.031	663	0.023	0.008	491	0.035	496	0.060	-0.026*
		[0.005]		[0.007]			[0.007]		[0.006]			[0.008]		[0.011]	
URGENT - Don't know	1173	0.227	1081	0.258	-0.031*	682	0.217	663	0.220	-0.003	491	0.240	496	0.296	-0.056**
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.019]		[0.021]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1178	0.324	1094	0.303	0.022	691	0.330	666	0.342	-0.012	487	0.316	499	0.291	0.026
		[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.018]		[0.018]			[0.021]		[0.020]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1178	0.266	1094	0.265	0.001	691	0.284	666	0.264	0.019	487	0.240	499	0.232	0.008
		[0.013]		[0.013]			[0.017]		[0.017]			[0.019]		[0.019]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1178	0.132	1094	0.113	0.019	691	0.133	666	0.122	0.012	487	0.131	499	0.138	-0.007
		[0.010]		[0.010]			[0.013]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.015]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1178	0.051	1094	0.049	0.002	691	0.038	666	0.048	-0.010	487	0.070	499	0.056	0.014
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.012]		[0.010]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1178	0.019	1094	0.033	-0.014**	691	0.012	666	0.015	-0.003	487	0.029	499	0.040	-0.011
		[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.008]		[0.009]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1178	0.208	1094	0.237	-0.029*	691	0.204	666	0.209	-0.005	487	0.214	499	0.242	-0.029
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.016]			[0.019]		[0.019]	

United States															
		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B1	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B2	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1611	0.389	1319	0.375	0.014	842	0.404	827	0.415	-0.011	769	0.373	776	0.448	-0.075***
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.017]		[0.017]			[0.017]		[0.018]	
GAP - Agree	1611	0.319	1319	0.287	0.032*	842	0.362	827	0.337	0.025	769	0.272	776	0.280	-0.008
		[0.012]		[0.012]			[0.017]		[0.016]			[0.016]		[0.016]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1611	0.163	1319	0.187	-0.025*	842	0.154	827	0.162	-0.008	769	0.172	776	0.170	0.002
		[0.009]		[0.011]			[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.014]		[0.013]	
GAP - Disagree	1611	0.069	1319	0.077	-0.008	842	0.051	827	0.059	-0.008	769	0.088	776	0.045	0.043***
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.010]		[0.007]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	1611	0.060	1319	0.074	-0.013	842	0.029	827	0.027	0.002	769	0.095	776	0.057	0.038***
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.011]		[0.008]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	1467	0.228	1217	0.200	0.027*	763	0.253	767	0.244	0.009	704	0.200	704	0.224	-0.024
		[0.011]		[0.011]			[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.015]		[0.016]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1467	0.480	1217	0.472	0.007	763	0.512	767	0.468	0.044*	704	0.445	704	0.440	0.004
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.018]		[0.018]			[0.019]		[0.019]	
DIFFICULT - Impossible	1467	0.115	1217	0.123	-0.008	763	0.084	767	0.082	0.002	704	0.149	704	0.139	0.010
		[0.008]		[0.009]			[0.010]		[0.010]			[0.013]		[0.013]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1467	0.177	1217	0.204	-0.027*	763	0.151	767	0.206	-0.055***	704	0.206	704	0.196	0.010
		[0.010]		[0.012]			[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.015]		[0.015]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1242	0.276	1045	0.272	0.004	648	0.298	631	0.296	0.001	594	0.253	580	0.247	0.006
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.018]		[0.018]			[0.018]		[0.018]	
URGENT - Urgently	1242	0.308	1045	0.279	0.029	648	0.316	631	0.293	0.023	594	0.300	580	0.233	0.067***
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.018]		[0.018]			[0.019]		[0.018]	
URGENT - Less urgently	1242	0.122	1045	0.131	-0.010	648	0.102	631	0.109	-0.007	594	0.143	580	0.157	-0.014
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.012]		[0.012]			[0.014]		[0.015]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1242	0.100	1045	0.106	-0.006	648	0.079	631	0.074	0.004	594	0.123	580	0.178	-0.055***

		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.010]			[0.013]		[0.016]	
URGENT - Don't know	1242	0.194	1045	0.211	-0.017	648	0.205	631	0.227	-0.021	594	0.182	580	0.186	-0.004
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.016]		[0.016]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1244	0.256	1038	0.204	0.051***	646	0.276	634	0.229	0.047*	598	0.234	576	0.220	0.014
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.018]		[0.017]			[0.017]		[0.017]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1244	0.273	1038	0.250	0.022	646	0.285	634	0.285	-0.001	598	0.259	576	0.210	0.049**
		[0.013]		[0.013]			[0.018]		[0.018]			[0.018]		[0.017]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1244	0.167	1038	0.200	-0.033**	646	0.166	634	0.170	-0.005	598	0.169	576	0.184	-0.015
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.015]		[0.015]			[0.015]		[0.016]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1244	0.109	1038	0.118	-0.009	646	0.080	634	0.109	-0.028*	598	0.139	576	0.132	0.007
		[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.014]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1244	0.063	1038	0.066	-0.003	646	0.048	634	0.062	-0.014	598	0.079	576	0.125	-0.046***
		[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.008]		[0.010]			[0.011]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1244	0.133	1038	0.162	-0.028*	646	0.146	634	0.145	0.000	598	0.120	576	0.128	-0.008
		[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.014]		[0.014]			[0.013]		[0.014]	

United Kingdom															
		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B1	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B2	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1004	0.470	1005	0.560	-0.090***	314	0.430	286	0.462	-0.032	637	0.505	667	0.454	0.051*
		[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.028]		[0.030]			[0.020]		[0.019]	
GAP - Agree	1004	0.330	1005	0.264	0.066***	314	0.379	286	0.357	0.022	637	0.298	667	0.355	-0.057**
		[0.015]		[0.014]			[0.027]		[0.028]			[0.018]		[0.019]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1004	0.127	1005	0.112	0.015	314	0.131	286	0.140	-0.009	637	0.124	667	0.129	-0.005
		[0.011]		[0.010]			[0.019]		[0.021]			[0.013]		[0.013]	
GAP - Disagree	1004	0.047	1005	0.032	0.015*	314	0.041	286	0.017	0.024*	637	0.052	667	0.040	0.011
		[0.007]		[0.006]			[0.011]		[0.008]			[0.009]		[0.008]	

GAP - Strongly disagree	1004	0.009	1005	0.012	-0.003	314	0.010	286	0.017	-0.008	637	0.008	667	0.013	-0.006
		[0.003]		[0.003]			[0.005]		[0.008]			[0.003]		[0.004]	
GAP - Don't know	1004	0.017	1005	0.020	-0.003	314	0.010	286	0.007	0.003	637	0.013	667	0.007	0.005
		[0.004]		[0.004]			[0.005]		[0.005]			[0.004]		[0.003]	
DIFFICULT - Very Easy	1004	0.019	1005	0.030	-0.011	314	0.019	286	0.021	-0.002	637	0.019	667	0.025	-0.007
		[0.004]		[0.005]			[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.005]		[0.006]	
DIFFICULT - Fairly Easy	1004	0.265	1005	0.195	0.070***	314	0.283	286	0.227	0.056	637	0.272	667	0.267	0.005
		[0.014]		[0.013]			[0.025]		[0.025]			[0.018]		[0.017]	
DIFFICULT - Fairly Difficult	1004	0.447	1005	0.463	-0.015	314	0.475	286	0.479	-0.004	637	0.432	667	0.447	-0.015
		[0.016]		[0.016]			[0.028]		[0.030]			[0.020]		[0.019]	
DIFFICULT - Very Difficult	1004	0.212	1005	0.260	-0.048**	314	0.191	286	0.206	-0.015	637	0.221	667	0.217	0.004
		[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.022]		[0.024]			[0.016]		[0.016]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1004	0.057	1005	0.053	0.004	314	0.032	286	0.066	-0.035**	637	0.057	667	0.043	0.013
		[0.007]		[0.007]			[0.010]		[0.015]			[0.009]		[0.008]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1004	0.304	1005	0.364	-0.060***	314	0.280	286	0.308	-0.027	637	0.327	667	0.307	0.019
		[0.015]		[0.015]			[0.025]		[0.027]			[0.019]		[0.018]	
URGENT - Fairly Urgently	1004	0.415	1005	0.404	0.011	314	0.462	286	0.423	0.039	637	0.392	667	0.405	-0.012
		[0.016]		[0.015]			[0.028]		[0.029]			[0.019]		[0.019]	
URGENT - Not very urgently	1004	0.176	1005	0.143	0.033**	314	0.162	286	0.178	-0.016	637	0.187	667	0.201	-0.014
		[0.012]		[0.011]			[0.021]		[0.023]			[0.015]		[0.016]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1004	0.034	1005	0.028	0.006	314	0.038	286	0.031	0.007	637	0.033	667	0.037	-0.005
		[0.006]		[0.005]			[0.011]		[0.010]			[0.007]		[0.007]	
URGENT - Don't know	1004	0.071	1005	0.061	0.010	314	0.057	286	0.059	-0.002	637	0.061	667	0.049	0.012
		[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.010]		[0.008]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1004	0.293	1005	0.353	-0.060***	314	0.287	286	0.325	-0.039	637	0.306	667	0.316	-0.010
		[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.026]		[0.028]			[0.018]		[0.018]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1004	0.350	1005	0.340	0.009	314	0.382	286	0.364	0.019	637	0.342	667	0.337	0.005
		[0.015]		[0.015]			[0.027]		[0.028]			[0.019]		[0.018]	

RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1004	0.197	1005	0.163	0.034**	314	0.204	286	0.192	0.012	637	0.181	667	0.196	-0.016
		[0.013]		[0.012]			[0.023]		[0.023]			[0.015]		[0.015]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1004	0.092	1005	0.075	0.017	314	0.080	286	0.063	0.017	637	0.104	667	0.097	0.006
		[0.009]		[0.008]			[0.015]		[0.014]			[0.012]		[0.011]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1004	0.036	1005	0.024	0.012	314	0.035	286	0.035	0.000	637	0.035	667	0.033	0.002
		[0.006]		[0.005]			[0.010]		[0.011]			[0.007]		[0.007]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1004	0.033	1005	0.045	-0.012	314	0.013	286	0.021	-0.008	637	0.033	667	0.019	0.013
		[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.006]		[0.008]			[0.007]		[0.005]	

<b>Denmark</b>					
		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)
<b>Variable</b>	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1010	0.207	1007	0.250	-0.043**
		[0.013]		[0.014]	
GAP - Agree	1010	0.325	1007	0.329	-0.004
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1010	0.242	1007	0.214	0.028
		[0.013]		[0.013]	
GAP - Disagree	1010	0.152	1007	0.143	0.009
		[0.011]		[0.011]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	1010	0.047	1007	0.043	0.004
		[0.007]		[0.006]	
GAP - Don't know	1010	0.028	1007	0.022	0.006
		[0.005]		[0.005]	
DIFFICULT - Very Easy	1010	0.044	1007	0.043	0.001
		[0.006]		[0.006]	
DIFFICULT - Fairly Easy	1010	0.392	1007	0.367	0.025

		[0.015]		[0.015]	
DIFFICULT - Fairly Difficult	1010	0.381	1007	0.419	-0.038*
		[0.015]		[0.016]	
DIFFICULT - Very Difficult	1010	0.090	1007	0.107	-0.017
		[0.009]		[0.010]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1010	0.093	1007	0.064	0.030**
		[0.009]		[0.008]	
URGENT - Very urgently	1010	0.164	1007	0.174	-0.009
		[0.012]		[0.012]	
URGENT - Fairly Urgently	1010	0.336	1007	0.380	-0.045**
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
URGENT - Not very urgently	1010	0.310	1007	0.291	0.019
		[0.015]		[0.014]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	1010	0.100	1007	0.078	0.022*
		[0.009]		[0.008]	
URGENT - Don't know	1010	0.090	1007	0.076	0.014
		[0.009]		[0.008]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1010	0.178	1007	0.220	-0.042**
		[0.012]		[0.013]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1010	0.333	1007	0.330	0.003
		[0.015]		[0.015]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1010	0.267	1007	0.248	0.019
		[0.014]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1010	0.132	1007	0.118	0.014
		[0.011]		[0.010]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1010	0.054	1007	0.051	0.004
		[0.007]		[0.007]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1010	0.036	1007	0.033	0.003

		[0.006]		[0.006]	
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<b>Indonesia</b>		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	923	0.413	906	0.373	0.040*
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
GAP - Agree	923	0.405	906	0.414	-0.009
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	923	0.158	906	0.182	-0.024
		[0.012]		[0.013]	
GAP - Disagree	923	0.022	906	0.028	-0.006
		[0.005]		[0.005]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	923	0.002	906	0.003	-0.001
		[0.002]		[0.002]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	923	0.488	906	0.541	-0.053**
		[0.016]		[0.017]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	923	0.467	906	0.424	0.043*
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
DIFFICULT - Impossible	923	0.046	906	0.035	0.010
		[0.007]		[0.006]	
URGENT - Very urgently	923	0.426	906	0.457	-0.031
		[0.016]		[0.017]	
URGENT - Urgently	923	0.519	906	0.472	0.047**
		[0.016]		[0.017]	
URGENT - Less urgently	923	0.038	906	0.056	-0.018*
		[0.006]		[0.008]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	923	0.017	906	0.014	0.003

		[0.004]		[0.004]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	923	0.348	906	0.328	0.020
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	923	0.375	906	0.390	-0.015
		[0.016]		[0.016]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	923	0.229	906	0.223	0.006
		[0.014]		[0.014]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	923	0.046	906	0.055	-0.010
		[0.007]		[0.008]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	923	0.003	906	0.004	-0.001
		[0.002]		[0.002]	

<b>Mexico</b>		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test		(1)		(2)	t-test
		Control		Treatment A	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B1	(1)-(2)		Control		Treatment B2	(1)-(2)
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	Difference
GAP - Strongly agree	1347	0.610	1116	0.591	0.020	927	0.656	847	0.601	0.055**	420	0.510	405	0.523	-0.014
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.024]		[0.025]	
GAP - Agree	1347	0.206	1116	0.247	-0.041**	927	0.198	847	0.221	-0.022	420	0.224	405	0.222	0.002
		[0.011]		[0.013]			[0.013]		[0.014]			[0.020]		[0.021]	
GAP - Neither agree nor disagree	1347	0.101	1116	0.083	0.018	927	0.087	847	0.097	-0.009	420	0.131	405	0.128	0.003
		[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.016]		[0.017]	
GAP - Disagree	1347	0.045	1116	0.040	0.004	927	0.040	847	0.051	-0.011	420	0.055	405	0.059	-0.004
		[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.006]		[0.008]			[0.011]		[0.012]	
GAP - Strongly disagree	1347	0.038	1116	0.039	-0.001	927	0.018	847	0.031	-0.012*	420	0.081	405	0.067	0.014
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.004]		[0.006]			[0.013]		[0.012]	
DIFFICULT - Easy	1288	0.195	1062	0.157	0.038**	890	0.209	805	0.226	-0.017	398	0.163	387	0.214	-0.051*
		[0.011]		[0.011]			[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.019]		[0.021]	
DIFFICULT - Difficult	1288	0.541	1062	0.578	-0.037*	890	0.563	805	0.503	0.060**	398	0.492	387	0.465	0.027

		[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.017]		[0.018]			[0.025]		[0.025]	
DIFFICULT - Impossible	1288	0.102	1062	0.082	0.020*	890	0.090	805	0.075	0.015	398	0.128	387	0.114	0.014
		[0.008]		[0.008]			[0.010]		[0.009]			[0.017]		[0.016]	
DIFFICULT - Don't know	1288	0.162	1062	0.183	-0.020	890	0.138	805	0.196	-0.058***	398	0.216	387	0.207	0.009
		[0.010]		[0.012]			[0.012]		[0.014]			[0.021]		[0.021]	
URGENT - Very urgently	999	0.535	848	0.498	0.037	681	0.562	654	0.534	0.029	318	0.475	313	0.438	0.037
		[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.019]		[0.020]			[0.028]		[0.028]	
URGENT - Urgently	999	0.254	848	0.259	-0.005	681	0.266	654	0.231	0.035	318	0.230	313	0.249	-0.020
		[0.014]		[0.015]			[0.017]		[0.016]			[0.024]		[0.024]	
URGENT - Less urgently	999	0.039	848	0.058	-0.019*	681	0.040	654	0.049	-0.009	318	0.038	313	0.096	-0.058***
		[0.006]		[0.008]			[0.007]		[0.008]			[0.011]		[0.017]	
URGENT - Not urgently at all	999	0.040	848	0.032	0.008	681	0.023	654	0.037	-0.013	318	0.075	313	0.051	0.024
		[0.006]		[0.006]			[0.006]		[0.007]			[0.015]		[0.012]	
URGENT - Don't know	999	0.132	848	0.153	-0.021	681	0.109	654	0.150	-0.041**	318	0.182	313	0.166	0.016
		[0.011]		[0.012]			[0.012]		[0.014]			[0.022]		[0.021]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly agree	1000	0.378	840	0.345	0.033	686	0.411	654	0.393	0.018	314	0.306	305	0.328	-0.022
		[0.015]		[0.016]			[0.019]		[0.019]			[0.026]		[0.027]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Agree	1000	0.231	840	0.236	-0.005	686	0.229	654	0.245	-0.016	314	0.236	305	0.252	-0.017
		[0.013]		[0.015]			[0.016]		[0.017]			[0.024]		[0.025]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Neither agree nor disagree	1000	0.183	840	0.177	0.006	686	0.178	654	0.154	0.023	314	0.194	305	0.144	0.050*
		[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.015]		[0.014]			[0.022]		[0.020]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Disagree	1000	0.071	840	0.074	-0.003	686	0.060	654	0.064	-0.004	314	0.096	305	0.098	-0.003
		[0.008]		[0.009]			[0.009]		[0.010]			[0.017]		[0.017]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Strongly disagree	1000	0.023	840	0.029	-0.006	686	0.017	654	0.021	-0.004	314	0.035	305	0.043	-0.008
		[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.005]		[0.006]			[0.010]		[0.012]	
RESPONSIBILITY - Don't know	1000	0.114	840	0.139	-0.025	686	0.105	654	0.122	-0.017	314	0.134	305	0.134	-0.001
		[0.010]		[0.012]			[0.012]		[0.013]			[0.019]		[0.020]	